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preface
In the slipstream of the debates in the United States, the notion of a ‘threatened’,
‘shrinking’ or ‘eroded’ middle class is now also causing a debate in Western
Europe. Is it a phenomenon that is also occurring in the Netherlands? That ques-
tion prompted the Netherlands Scientiﬁc Council for Government Policy (wrr) to
conduct this investigation into developments in the middle segment of Dutch
society. We do not use the term ‘middle class’ or ‘middle group’ in this study, but
refer instead to the middle segment of society or to middle groups. The middle
segment of Dutch society is too heterogeneous and too broad to speak of ‘the’ mid-
dle class or ‘the’ middle group. For this study we have explored developments in
the domains of labour, education and income, as well as examining views about
politics and society.
The Dutch report De val van de middenklasse? which was presented on 6 July 2017
included articles from various academics – economists as well as sociologists –
who looked at the middle segment through different lenses. Tolsma and Wolbers
outline the social position of people in the Netherlands with an intermediate edu-
cation level. Ganzeboom describes the middle segment of Dutch society on the
basis of their occupations. Salverda analyses the size and the share of total income
of the middle-income group in the Netherlands. De Beer describes the income
dynamics of the middle groups over the last few decades. Van der Waal, De Koster
and Van Noord analyse the positions adopted by people with an intermediate edu-
cation on two aspects of the socio-cultural divide between the low-skilled and the
high-skilled, namely societal discontent and distrust of politics. We would like to
thank the authors for their valuable contributions. We would also like to thank
Hans Schmeets, who wrote the wrr Working Paper 26 on Trust in each other and
in society for this project.1
In chapter 1 Engbersen, Snel, Kremer and Went present the main ﬁndings of this
wrr report, and formulate four policy directions: greater security on the labour
market, investment in education and training, preservation of the redistributive
effect of the welfare state, and support for families. In chapter 2, Engbersen and
Snel provide an analysis of the development of the middle segment of Dutch
society over the last few decades. They explore both the socio-economic develop-
ment of the middle segment of society (in terms of education, occupation and
income) and socio-cultural processes that are occurring in the domain of attitudes
(towards their own position and towards major social issues) and in the political
domain (particularly their trust in politics). Chapter 3, by Kremer, Das and Schrijv-
ers, provides an analysis of focus groups with representatives of the middle
groups. Insecurity turns out to be the main characteristic of their view. The ﬁnd-
9
ings presented in this study suggest the existence of both a stable and a vulnerable
middle segment of society, but people have to work harder to remain in the mid-
dle.
1 0 t h e  f a l l  o f  t h e  m i d d l e  c l a s s ?
note
1 On 19 June 2015 the wrr also organised a seminar of experts entitled Middle classes under
pressure? European perspectives, with papers by Professor Steffen Mau (Humboldt Univer-
sity, Berlin), Professor Martin Kronauer (ipe, Berlin), Horacio Levy (oecd), Professor Ive
Marx (University of Antwerp), Professor Gabriël van den Brink (University of Twente) and
Professor Bas ter Weel (University of Maastricht/cpb), as well as the authors of the separate
chapters in this report. The wrr also beneﬁted from a plenary conference entitled Onzeker in
het midden: de staat van het middenklasse (Insecurity in the Middle. The State of the Middle
Class), organised by the Social Sciences Council of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts
and Sciences (knaw) (27 and 28 May 2016) with contributions by Professor Mark Bovens
(University of Utrecht/wrr), Professor Monique Kremer (University of Amsterdam/wrr),
Professor Godfried Engbersen (Erasmus University Rotterdam/wrr), Professor Bas ter Weel
(University of Maastricht/cpb), Professor Paul Dekker (University of Twente/scp) and Pro-
fessor Remieg Aerts (Radboud University).
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1 the fall of the middle class? stability
and vulnerability in the middle segment
of society
Godfried Engbersen, Erik Snel, Monique Kremer and Robert Went
1 .1 stability and vulnerability
Contrary to what many disturbing reports might suggest, the middle segment of
Dutch society is not being eroded and is not in decline. The majority of the mem-
bers of the middle groups in society are maintaining their position and avoiding
social decline. They are doing so by working harder in more uncertain circumstan-
ces. Households increasingly need two incomes, have to adjust to the ﬂexibility
and temporary nature of work, must combine work with informal care tasks and
display a greater ability to fend for themselves in coping with risks. This combina-
tion of factors is accompanied by a growing sense of insecurity, as well as a feeling
that the government is doing too little for the middle groups in society. It is impor-
tant for the government to focus on reducing insecurity in order to assuage the
vulnerability and bolster the stability of the middle groups in society.
This investigation examines the changes that have occurred in the middle segment
of Dutch society since the 1970s. Four aspects are analysed: developments affecting
people with middle incomes, intermediate education and in intermediate occupa-
tions, and attitudes towards politics and society. The most important ﬁndings are:
– The middle classes are too heterogeneous and too broad to speak of ‘the’ mid-
dle class or ‘the’ middle group. We therefore refer to the middle segment of
society or middle groups.
– The optimism among the middle groups that things will always get better has
come to an end. They have to work harder to maintain their position and avoid
downward social mobility.
– Many members of the middle groups in the Netherlands are equipped to meet
the demands of modern society in terms of employability and resilience and
are therefore capable of preserving their position in the middle groups.
– The main threats to the middle segment of society are: (1) educational or cre-
dential inﬂation; (2) the disappearance of routine administrative jobs and the
growth of low-paid service jobs; and (3) a shrinking middle segment when
measured on the basis of market or gross income.
– There is one sub-segment of the middle groups that is threatened. This vulner-
able segment is comprised mainly of people with intermediate education
(qualiﬁcations at senior secondary vocational education (mbo) level) and who
work in routine administrative jobs or jobs in a caring or service occupation.
1 3
They are more likely to lose their jobs or earn a low income. If supplementary
income disappears, for example because a person’s partner is made redundant,
downward social mobility can quickly become a reality.
– The views on politics and social issues of people educated to mbo level have
converged strongly with those of people with a lower level of education. The
same applies with respect to feelings of discontent and the sense of having no
control over one’s future. Members of this group are very critical of immigra-
tion and open borders and have little faith in the eu or the Dutch House of
Representatives.
The most important policy recommendations are:
– Promote greater certainty in the labour market. Encourage employers to hire
more people on permanent employment contracts and make less use of ﬂexi-
ble workers: work should only be ﬂexible if that is appropriate to the nature of
the work. Forms of ﬂexible labour will continue to exist, so new certainties are
required, such as collective insurance against incapacity for work and mini-
mum rates for self-employed persons. In the longer term, there is a need for a
fundamental debate about a new system of social security that covers every
type of work, regardless of contractual form.
– Invest in education and training. Working people with intermediate education
need to receive training so that they can compete with more high-skilled
workers, for example by improving their it skills. Develop wider possibilities
for ‘learning on the job’ and facilities for lifelong learning.
– Preserve the redistributive effect of the welfare state. The trend in the
Netherlands is to provide relief for those at the bottom end of society (through
allowances, for example). A side-effect of this is that the middle groups feel rel-
atively more vulnerable. It is essential to preserve the redistributive effect of
the welfare state in order to prevent the middle segment of society from
shrinking and their position from deteriorating.
– Support for families. The resilience of the middle groups will increase if they
are able to properly combine informal care and work. Stable and affordable
child care is very important in that context.
These central ﬁndings and policy suggestions are ﬂeshed out in more detail later in
this chapter. The central question addressed in this study is to what extent the
socio-economic position of society’s middle segment has become more vulnerable
and how the views of the members of this group towards politics and their own
position in society have changed. This study represents an attempt to answer the
following four clusters of questions :
1. Education: what changes occurred in the size and labour market position of the
group of people with intermediate education between 1980 and 2010? Did the
labour market position of this group deteriorate?
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2. Occupations: which occupational groups grew in size and which shrank in the
period 1970-2014? Are intermediate occupations disappearing and is there evi-
dence of polarisation in the occupational structure?
3. Incomes: what changes occurred in the size and the incomes of middle-income
households in relation to the low-income and high-income households in the
period 1990-2014? Has the ﬁnancial position of the middle segment of society
deteriorated?
4. Attitudes and trust in politics: how do people in the middle segment perceive
and rate their position, what are their views on politics and society and what
are their expectations for the future?
First and foremost, this investigation endeavours to explain in conceptual and
empirical terms what is happening in the “broad social middle” in the Netherlands
(Berting 1968; Wijmans 1987). Hard data on the subject is lacking, something
which is also the case in many other European countries. Atkinson and Brandolini
(2013: 78) refer to “the forgotten middle” (see also Mau 2014; Van Dalen 2015).
The empirical basis of this study consists of analyses carried out by a number of
Dutch researchers speciﬁcally for this report. Other sources were earlier studies, as
well as an analysis of interviews conducted with focus groups (see chapter 3). We
begin this introductory chapter with a brief explanation of how we have deﬁned
the middle segment and present the key ﬁndings from our analyses. (The ﬁndings
are discussed in more detail in chapter 2). We then discuss some of the changes
which are causing (or could cause) growing uncertainty among the middle groups
and which have made maintaining a position in the social middle more difﬁcult.
The next question we address is what role the government can play in reducing
insecurity.
1 .2 the middle segment of society:  debate and
delineation
Concerns have been growing in recent years about the socio-economic position of
some groups in the middle segment of Dutch society (Goos et al. 2014; Van den
Berge and Ter Weel 2015; Dekker et al. 2015). Institutional certainties have become
less secure for the middle groups, who therefore now have more to lose than they
used to. The number of stable jobs for workers with intermediate education is fall-
ing due to the ﬂexibilisation of the labour market, and investments in secondary,
and even higher education, are yielding less in professional terms (Tolsma and
Wolbers 2010; Ter Weel 2012 and 2015). There is now talk in the Netherlands of “an
erosion of the middle class” (Blom et al. 2014), a “vulnerable class” (abn amro
2014), a “stagnating middle class” (Stegeman 2016) and even “the fall of the middle
class” (De Waard 2015).
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Fear of social decline
It is clear from the debate in the Netherlands that the issue of the “threatened mid-
dle class” is no longer conﬁned to the United States, where studies referring to a
“fear of falling” (Ehrenreich 1989) or “falling from grace” (Newman 1988) were
already appearing at the end of the 1980s.1 The subject is now also being debated in
Western Europe (Mau 2013).2 In France the debate focuses on whether social mobi-
lity is stagnating (Chauvel 2006; Fourquet et al. 2013; Peugny 2013). The question is
not just whether younger generations will perform a higher or lower occupation
than their parents, but also what standard of living they can expect. The difﬁculty
that certain groups in the middle segment face in buying their own home, the ﬂexi-
bilisation of the labour market, the rising levels of debt, higher ﬁxed costs and even
the phenomenon of shorter holidays are all seen as indications that today’s middle
groups are less well-off than their predecessors, even those who belong in profes-
sional terms to the same occupational class as their parents. Characteristic of the
debate in France is the attention paid to differences between the generations,
partly because the French welfare state serves older generations better than
younger ones. The middle groups’ fear of downward social mobility (la peur du
déclassement) also receives a lot of attention (Maurin 2009; Peugny 2009).
In Germany, a study by the Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (diw) and
the University of Bremen shows that the German middle class shrank between
1997 and 2010 (Burkhardt et al. 2012). Considerable attention has also been devoted
in Germany to the emotions and feelings of the middle groups, including the fear
of social decline (Abstiegangst). Other research in Germany has shown that fear of
losing one’s job has increased more in a particular segment of the middle class í
skilled and semi-skilled workers í than among people in the higher or lower socio-
economic classes (Lengveld and Hirsche 2009; Arndt 2012; Mau 2012). A substan-
tial number of middle-class people are also concerned about their ability to main-
tain their current lifestyle as they grow older, and whether their children will be
able to attain a similar standard of living.
These debates and publications raise questions about the position and develop-
ment of the middle groups in Dutch society. Who precisely are the middle groups
in Dutch society? How can we deﬁne and circumscribe the middle segment of
society? Which dimensions of the socio-economic position of the middle class
should we take into account? The debates about the middle class concern people
with intermediate education, persons and households with middle incomes and
people in intermediate occupations. The chosen perspective has implications for
the ﬁndings because these population groups only partially overlap. A person with
intermediate education is not necessarily in an intermediate occupation, and a
high-skilled person may earn a low income. Nevertheless, there is a correlation
between level of education, level of occupation and income position (De Beer
2015: 154; Savage 2015: 69). Moreover, the issue is not just the social position of the
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middle groups (in terms of education, occupation or income), but also their views
and attitudes. Studies in the Netherlands and abroad have shown that perceptions
of politics and society, and how people rate their own personal situation within
society, are relevant for an understanding of the position of middle groups.3 An
important theme is the possible decline in trust in politics among the middle
groups.
For this study it was decided to cast the net wide on the basis of four basic princi-
ples:
1. First, we do not use the term middle class or middle group in this study, but
refer to the middle segment of society or to middle groups. The middle segment
of Dutch society is too heterogeneous and too disparate to speak of ‘the’ mid-
dle class or ‘the’ middle group (Berting 1968; Vrooman et al. 2014).
2. Second, we consider all three aspects of the socio-economic position of the
middle segment of Dutch society: education, income and occupation. Wher-
ever possible, we explore the relationship between level of education, level of
occupation and level of income.
3. Third, we adopt a developmental perspective. To express any opinion about a
possible polarisation in the occupational structure or about a relative deterio-
ration in the situation of people with intermediate education and middle
incomes, developments have to be reviewed over a period of time.
4. Fourth, we also analyse subjective aspects of the position of the middle seg-
ment of society on the basis of surveys and qualitative research among focus
groups. Our main focus concerns their views about politics, society and their
own position.
Deﬁning the middle segment of society
This study is based on the following starting points. First, our analyses cover per-
sons between the ages of 25 and 65; in principle no students or pensioners are
included (with the exception of Salverda’s contribution (2017), whose analysis also
extends to 15 to 25-year-olds and includes many students).4 Second, we use the fol-
lowing deﬁnitions to circumscribe the middle segment of Dutch society:
– Intermediate education
With regard to education, we distinguish people with intermediate education
(persons whose highest level of education attained is senior secondary voca-
tional education( mbo), senior general secondary education (havo) or pre-uni-
versity education (vwo)) from the low-skilled (people who have only comple-
ted primary education or preparatory secondary vocational education (vmbo))
and the high-skilled (people who have completed a higher professional educa-
tion (hbo) or an academic education). In some cases we focus on a particular
sub-category of the group of people with intermediate education, i.e. individu-
als with qualiﬁcations at mbo level.
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– Intermediate occupations
As regards occupations, we follow the classiﬁcation of occupations devised by
Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979). This classiﬁcation distinguishes
between different types of occupations. Higher occupations, for example,
include higher-grade professionals or managers, while lower occupations are
skilled or unskilled manual work. According to this typology, intermediate
occupations relate to routine service occupations (such as workers in adminis-
tration and sales and carers), small business proprietors with employees, self-
employed persons and self-employed farmers, supervisors of manual work
(‘foremen’) and high-skilled manual workers. Rather than by type of work,
occupations can also be classiﬁed according to the average income earned in
each category of occupation. As we shall see, that classiﬁcation produces differ-
ent outcomes.
– Middle incomes
In terms of income, the middle segment is delineated by the distance from the
median household income. The median income is the precise midpoint of the
income distribution; in other words the point at which 50% of all households
(or individuals) have a higher income and 50% have a lower income. The mid-
dle-income groups comprise households with a household income of between
60% and 200% of the median income. In this study the income classes are gen-
erally based on standardised disposable household income, in other words the
net disposable income of households after deduction of social insurance con-
tributions and taxes and corrected for differences in the composition of house-
holds. However, some analyses are based on gross or net household income
(these deﬁnitions of income are explained further in chapter 2). As we shall see,
different deﬁnitions of income produce different outcomes.
However, some of the analyses adopt a different delineation of the middle-
income groups. In those cases, households are arranged into 10-percent or 20-
percent groups according to income (in other words, by income deciles or
quintiles). In that case, the 20% of households with the lowest incomes are
seen as the low-income group and the 20% with the highest incomes as the
high-income group. The middle-income groups are then all households in the
third to the eighth decile (or the second, third and fourth quintile).
When we view the middle segment of society through these three socio-economic
lenses (education, occupation and income), we do not always ﬁnd the same house-
holds or individuals (cf. De Beer 2015; Savage 2015). On the contrary, a number of
the issues arising in the current debate actually concern questions such as: Can
people with intermediate education still ﬁnd work in an intermediate occupation,
or are they being squeezed out of the intermediate segment of the occupational
structure by people with higher education? Do people with an intermediate occu-
pation still earn a middle income, or are they increasingly dependent on a lower
income due to technological developments and the growth of part-time and ﬂexi-
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ble work? We therefore endeavour to analyse these three aspects in relation to one
another, as well as assessing developments that have occurred over time. And as
already mentioned, in addition to these three socio-economic perspectives, we
also consider subjective aspects.
1 .3 key findings:  stability,  vulnerability and insecurity
in the middle
This study shows that many groups in the middle segment of Dutch society are
equipped to survive ﬁnancially and economically. We refer to them as ‘the stable
middle’. At the same time, however, we identify social and ﬁnancial-economic
developments that could weaken the position of the middle groups (or some sub-
segments of those groups), whom we call ‘the vulnerable middle’. Furthermore,
the different methods we have used to analyse the developments affecting the
middle segment of society produce different outcomes. The most important ﬁnd-
ings can be summarised as follows.
Education: convergence of people with intermediate education towards the low-skilled
Looking at the middle segment from an educational perspective, we see that since
the end of the 1970s the proportion of adults (aged between 25 and 65 years) with
an intermediate education has not declined, but has risen. The number of people
with intermediate education is growing steadily, while there has been a steep
decline in the proportion of low-skilled people in the Dutch adult population. A
threatening development for people with intermediate education is the phenom-
enon of credential inﬂation: despite the growth in the share of people with inter-
mediate education in the last few decades, there has been no concomitant rise in
their average occupational level. Due to technological advances and the competi-
tion from people with a higher level of education doing work for which they are
over-qualiﬁed, intermediate-skilled workers often ﬁnd themselves competing
with low-skilled workers for lower-level jobs.
In their contribution to this wrr study, Tolsma and Wolbers (2017) show that in
the period 1985-2010 the occupational position of people with intermediate edu-
cation worsened signiﬁcantly more than that of the low-skilled. The occupational
position of intermediate and low-skilled workers has converged, while the gap
between those two groups and high-skilled workers has widened. Although the
number of intermediate occupations in the Netherlands has not reduced, the chan-
ces of people with intermediate education entering those occupations have rece-
ded.
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Occupations: growth at the bottom end of the scale, but polarisation when measured by
earned income
Viewed through an occupational lens, analysis of the development of the middle
segment does not suggest that intermediate occupations are in decline in the
Netherlands. While the proportion of jobs in intermediate occupations fell
slightly between 1970 and 2014, there was especially strong growth in the propor-
tion of jobs in high-skilled occupations and a sharp decline in jobs in less skilled
occupations (skilled and unskilled manual labour). In other words, there has been
no job polarisation (growth at the top and the bottom of the occupational struc-
ture and contraction in the middle), but rather expansion at the top and contrac-
tion at the bottom of the occupational structure. Sociologists refer in this regard to
a trend of professionalisation.
In his contribution to this study, Ganzeboom (2017) describes the development of
the occupational structure in Netherlands in the period 1970-2014. Whether there
has been polarisation or professionalisation of the occupational structure depends
on how one arranges the occupational classes. If, as in the case of sociological occu-
pational classiﬁcations, a distinction is drawn between low-skill, intermediate-
skill and high-skill occupations, there has been professionalisation: growth at the
top, a slight decline in the middle and a sharp decline at the bottom of the occupa-
tional structure. The same conclusion emerges if we arrange occupational classes
in other ways (according to level of education or occupational prestige, for
example).
However, we ﬁnd something else if we arrange the various occupational classes
according to earned income. An economic approach of that kind leads to the ﬁnd-
ing that there has been job polarisation: while the proportions of jobs in high-paid
and low-paid occupations in the overall occupational structure is growing, the
number of jobs in occupations in the middle segment is declining (cf. Goos et al.
2014). The discrepancy in the outcomes is mainly attributable to the growing num-
ber of care workers, mainly women, who earn relatively little but do not consider
themselves to be at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy and, in terms of their
education, do not belong there.
Another threatening development for people with intermediate education is that
some intermediate occupations (principally routine administrative functions) are
disappearing or have already disappeared. Women (who are heavily over-represen-
ted in these occupations) and older workers (who may be less able to adapt to new
technologies) will be particularly affected by this development. Until now, the
contraction of jobs in these occupations has been offset by the growth in other
intermediate occupations (lower-grade professionals in the education, care and
personal services sectors) (cf. Van Berge and Ter Weel 2015: 14).
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Incomes: stability and decline
Looking at the development of the middle segment of Dutch society in the period
1990-2014 through the lens of income, we also note stability and vulnerability,
although the situation varies depending on the deﬁnition of income that is used. If
we look solely at what (members of ) households earn (in other words, gross
household income), there has been a sharp decline in the proportion of house-
holds with a middle income and in their share of total income. Between 1990 and
2014, the proportion of middle-income households fell from 68% to 57%, while
their share of aggregate household income dropped from 71% to 57%.
These downward trends are offset to a considerable extent by the redistributive
effect of the Dutch welfare state and by the fact that people with higher incomes
usually have larger households (and therefore a lower standardised income). On
the basis of standardised household income (which takes account of the size of
households and the tax and social insurance contributions they pay), the propor-
tion of households with a middle income is substantial and fairly stable. It is only
since 2006 that the proportion of middle-income households has declined –
slightly – from 80% to 76% of all households. Their share of income has also
remained relatively stable over time, though it also fell slightly between 2010 and
2014 (from 79% to 77%).
The distribution of wealth among different income groups is also signiﬁcantly
more equal than is often assumed. In his contribution to this wrr study, Salverda
(2017) shows that even some low-income households have substantial assets:
although the ﬁgure varies from year to year, households in the lowest income
group possess between 5% and 10% of the total wealth in the Netherlands. Middle-
income households possesses roughly two-thirds of the total wealth. This cate-
gory includes households whose mortgage has been paid off and self-employed
persons with a low or intermediate income but with substantial private capital or
business assets.5
Turning to the development of purchasing power, it transpires that it is actually
the higher income groups, and to a lesser extent the higher middle-income groups,
whose disposable income has diminished over the last few decades. The position
of the lower and lower-middle income groups has meanwhile improved year on
year; see De Beer’s (2017) analysis, whose ﬁndings show that the purchasing power
of the lower-income groups has improved by more than that of the middle-income
groups.
There is no evidence that middle-income households descend into poverty more
frequently than in the past. Generally speaking, income dynamics are limited; with
the majority of households remaining in the same income group over the years.
Downward income mobility, if it does occur, is almost always conﬁned to a single
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income class. Between 12% and 28% of households with a middle income experi-
ence a decline in income from one year to the next and consequently drop into a
lower income class. Most upward or downward income mobility is caused by
changing personal circumstances in the household (moving in together, divorce,
having a baby, a child leaving home) or is work-related (losing a job or starting a
new job). In short, the middle segment of society remains in the middle in terms of
income – in part because of the Dutch system of tax and social insurance. The
dynamics that do occur are due primarily to changes in family situation or at work.
Attitudes: growing uncertainty
Besides these socio-economic developments, we also studied the perceptions and
attitudes of the middle groups with regard to their personal position, important
social issues and politics. Many members of the middle groups still occupy the
middle ground between the low-skilled and the highly-skilled (Bijl et al. 2015),
although people with intermediate education have in recent decades tended to
become more critical on issues relating to globalisation (such as the immigration
society, the disappearance of borders and the open economy) and towards political
institutions such as the Dutch House of Representatives and the eu (see Tolsma
and Wolbers 2017 and Van der Waal et al. 2017; see also Dekker et al. 2015).
Another important trend is that the views of people in the middle segment with
an education up to mbo level (in contrast to individuals with havo or vwo qualiﬁ-
cations) have started to converge strongly with those of the low-skilled, both in
relation to politics and social issues and in terms of feelings of societal discontent
and a sense of not having control over their own future (see chapter 2).6
– In 2014, 35% of people educated to mbo level had the feeling of ‘having little
control over my own future’, while 54% felt that that ‘the government does not
do enough for people like me’ and 66% felt that ‘people like me have no inﬂu-
ence whatsoever on what the government does’. These percentages correspond
closely with those of the low-skilled (40%, 51% and 70%, respectively) and
diverge from the ﬁgures for people with a higher education (24%, 31% and 48%,
respectively).
– In 2014, 33% of people educated to mbo level said they suffered ‘mainly disad-
vantages from the disappearance of borders’, the same percentage as among
those with a lower level of education. Only 14% of high-skilled people shared
that view.
– People educated to mbo level have signiﬁcantly less trust in other people and in
most institutions (political or otherwise) than people educated to havo or vwo
level. Another ﬁnding was that in the period 2013-2016 the attitudes of people
with mbo qualiﬁcations had come to resemble those of people with vmbo
qualiﬁcations more closely in this regard (Schmeets 2017).
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An addendum to these ﬁndings is that it is not possible to infer from general ﬁg-
ures for the period between 1971 and 2016 that trust in politics is declining (Tho-
massen 2010; Schmeets 2017). Two trends are emerging, however. First, middle
groups are more inclined than other social groups to switch their allegiance from
one political party to another at elections, but they still vote for centre parties. This
political volatility suggests a loss of trust in speciﬁc centre parties, but is not an
indication of a growing mistrust of democracy (Thomassen 2010; Van der Meer
2017). A second trend is that the opinions of a sub-category of the middle segment
(people educated up to mbo level) regarding the Dutch House of Representatives
and the eu have shifted closer to those of people with a lower level of education.
Finally, the interviews with focus groups of representatives of middle groups
revealed insecurity to be a dominant feature in how they see their position (see
Kremer et al. chapter 3). That uncertainty leads to concerns about the prospects for
their own future and that of their children and causes some to adopt a short-term
perspective that is similar to that of lower social groups.7 There are two principal
causes of this insecurity: developments on the labour market (credential inﬂation
and the ﬂexibilisation of the labour market) and the diminished protection provi-
ded by a retreating government. There is a perception that the welfare state is
mainly for the lower class and that they themselves beneﬁt little from it.
The middle groups are having to learn to live with greater insecurity. Citizens feel
that the risks and insecurities have increased, while the government is offering less
social protection. This greater institutional insecurity marks a break with the tradi-
tional post-war middle-class outlook: a deeply-rooted personal conviction that
they themselves, and above all their children, would always fare better. That opti-
mism about the future is increasingly being called into question.
1 .4 permanent status work for maintaining a position
in the middle
What distinguishes the middle segment of society from the groups at the top and
bottom of the class structure is that it has something to gain and something to lose.
People in the highest social class can afford to lose a little and the underclass is
focused mainly on day-to-day survival (Schimank et al. 2014; Standing 2012). Mid-
dle groups want to improve, or at least consolidate, their position and avoid down-
ward social mobility (cf. De Swaan 1990; Eydems 1998).
During the post-war period, for a long time the middle groups in Dutch society
mainly had something to gain. They climbed the social ladder and experienced an
unprecedented improvement in their material well-being. They could improve
their social position by investing sensibly (in education, a home and savings). Vari-
ous institutional certainties also allowed them to make long-term plans: the cer-
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tainty of work and a permanent job and the assurance that investments in educa-
tion would be rewarded. There was also a system of social welfare arrangements in
place to reduce the risks of unemployment, incapacity for work and illness (Van
Kersbergen and Vis 2016). The middle classes therefore had control over their own
future and that of their children. The work they had to perform to maintain or
improve their social status was predictable and often proved rewarding (Tolsma
and Wolbers 2010).
This study shows that upward social mobility and the associated optimism are no
longer self-evident. Middle groups are now more focused on maintaining their
position and avoiding downward social mobility. This reversal is the result of insti-
tutional changes that have made life more uncertain, less predictable and less plan-
nable. Although these developments do not affect only the middle groups, they are
clearly affected by them – and sometimes more heavily than other social groups.
The middle segment as a cyclist: keep pedalling or fall off
According to the German researchers Schimank et al. (2014), it has become more
difﬁcult to achieve a typical middle-class biography. In that context, they intro-
duced the term ‘status work’. Status work relates to the work that middle groups
have to perform in order to retain their social standing. Strategic investments in
economic capital (through work, income and assets) and cultural capital (educa-
tion and further training) are particularly important for safeguarding one’s posi-
tion and that of one’s children. More than ever this status work demands constant
care and attention. Schimank et al. use the metaphor of a cyclist to explain the
nature of modern status work. A cyclist who stops pedalling will eventually fall
off.8 Similarly, members of the middle groups who are unwilling or unable to
invest constantly in economic and cultural capital face the risk of social decline.
Obtaining a diploma and securing a permanent job used to provide a solid founda-
tion for a middle-class existence, but that is no longer the case. Middle groups must
remain constantly alert and be willing to make the necessary investments by
changing jobs, earning two incomes, updating their skills in time and combining
work and care in order to consolidate their position. In contrast to the post-war
period, they must – to continue the cycling metaphor – keep pedalling harder to
avoid falling off or dropping behind.
This need for permanent status work stems from various institutional changes
that are already threatening the socio-economic position of the middle segment of
society and will continue to do so in the future. We concentrate here on four insti-
tutions that once laid the foundations of a middle-class life: permanent work, the
value of an education, proﬁt from government provisions and services and stable
familial relationships. The changes occurring within these institutions have impli-
cations for the position of members of the middle groups, although not exclusively
for them.
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Greater job insecurity
The ﬁrst trend is the growing insecurity of working life. Securing a good job is no
guarantee of a carefree future. A growing number of people in the middle groups
have temporary employment contracts. A ‘job for life’, the former ideal of the mid-
dle class, is no longer always a reality. This insecurity is reinforced by the strong
trend towards the ﬂexibilisation of the labour market in the Netherlands (Kremer
et al. 2017).9 A quarter of all employees in the Netherlands now have a temporary
contract; in other words, they have an employment contract for a ﬁxed period
and/or for a variable number of hours per week. Furthermore, the proportion of
self-employed persons (with or without employees) has grown rapidly in the
Netherlands. In the third quarter of 2016 more than a million people were self-
employed (in combination with a job or otherwise).10
The result of these two trends is that the proportion of working persons with a
permanent employment relationship has been declining for decades, falling from
74% in 2003 to 62% in 2015 (Statistics Netherlands (cbs) StatLine 2016). Although
this trend towards a more ﬂexible labour market is more marked among low-skil-
led workers than among people with intermediate education, the proportion of
people with ﬂexible contracts (temporary work, varying weekly working hours or
work as a self-employed contractor) among people with intermediate education
rose from 25% to 37% between 2003 and 2015 (see ﬁgure 1.1). This trend is more evi-
dent among young adults (particularly those entering an occupation for the ﬁrst
time) than among older workers.
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Figure 1.1 Proportion of people with ﬂexible jobs* in the Netherlands, by level of
education (2003-2015)
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* Flexible workers are employees with a temporary contract or a ﬂexible number of working hours
per week (including people working via an employment agency or on an on-call basis) and self-
employed persons with or without employees.
Source: Data from Statistics Netherlands (cbs) StatLine (edited by the report’s authors)
It is impossible to say with any certainty what this ﬂexibilisation of the labour mar-
ket signiﬁes for working persons, and particularly for the middle segment of
society. On the one hand, young adults are accommodating themselves to the sit-
uation; on the other, it is a fact that a growing number of working persons are hav-
ing to live with insecurity and ﬂuid situations (Dekker 2017). The latter can be a
conscious choice í young people could opt for entrepreneurship and a variety of
challenges í but can at the same time lead to insecurity and a lack of recognition
(Van Lieshout 2016; Schimank et al. 2014; Van der Klein 2017), particularly if
people are not only working on a ﬂexible basis, but also depend on occupations
below their level of qualiﬁcations í something that is more prevalent among
people with intermediate education than the more high-skilled.
For many young people ﬂexible employment relationships mean having to put off
starting the rest of their lives: they make it difﬁcult for them to make decisions on
where to settle, whether to buy a house and whether to start a family, especially if
both partners have insecure and ﬂexible work (Kremer 2017). A ﬂexible labour mar-
ket demands a high degree of employability on the part of workers. It is crucial for
individuals to have the capacity to be repeatedly employable in a changing labour
market because many certainties are linked to an employment contract, such as
training, entitlement to unemployment beneﬁt and pension rights.
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Depreciation in the value of a secondary education: credential inﬂation in the middle
A second trend confronting the middle segment of society is the depreciation in
the value of a secondary education: due on the one hand to technological develop-
ments (automation), and to competition from people with higher education work-
ing below the level of their qualiﬁcations on the other, more and more people with
intermediate education end up in lower-level occupations, and the occupational
level of people with intermediate education has declined signiﬁcantly faster than
that of the low-skilled in the last few decades (see Tolsma and Wolbers 2017).
These two categories have converged in terms of occupational level, while the gap
relative to the occupational level of the high-skilled has widened.
We do not know whether this trend will continue in the future. Further automa-
tion and digitalisation could lead to the disappearance of more manual and routine
administrative jobs for which intermediate skills used to be a requirement (Social
and Economic Council (ser) 2016a; Went et al. 2015). We are already seeing this
happening in the banking and insurance sectors. A study by the oecd and McKin-
sey (quoted by Van der Veen 2016: 92), which looked at the potential for automa-
tion of speciﬁc aspects of jobs, concluded that some changes will occur in practi-
cally every job and that relatively few jobs will be entirely automated within the
foreseeable future. In other words, completing a secondary or higher education
does not provide any guarantee of a certain future. Many people with a secondary
education will either have to retrain or compete with less skilled employees if they
want to retain a job
Less for the middle: diminished social protection
A third trend that is causing greater insecurity is the diminishing social protection
afforded by the welfare state (Vrooman 2016; Van Lieshout 2016). The systemic
reforms that have been implemented since the end of the 1980s can be summed up
in two words: retrenchment and activation (Engelen et al. 2007; Kersbergen and
Vis 2016). The government is making greater demands on the self-reliance of citi-
zens. This can be seen, for example, in the privatisation of various elements of the
social security system whereby risks have been delegated to businesses or individ-
ual citizens. For example, as early as the 1990s the cover provided by the Sickness
Beneﬁts Act was replaced by the obligation on employers to continue paying the
salaries of employees who are sick. Since then the ﬁnancial risk of an employee’s
illness has been borne not by the government but by individual employers for the
ﬁrst two years. Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s second cabinet shortened the maxi-
mum period of entitlement to unemployment beneﬁt from three to two years,
transferring the ﬁnancial risk of long-term unemployment to individual citizens.
(The employers’ organisations and the trade unions subsequently agreed a scheme
to compensate for the disappearance of the third year of unemployment beneﬁt).
The same government also increased the excess paid by citizens on health insur-
ance and abolished public student grants (although students can now take out a
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loan on favourable terms to ﬁnance the costs of their studies). Further measures
along these lines could lead to a residualisation of welfare state arrangements,
which is to say the government would guarantee social provisions and services for
the most vulnerable members of society, but that those who are less vulnerable
would mainly be expected to solve their own problems. National social assistance
(bijstand) is one example of such a residual arrangement: only households without
any other income qualify for these welfare beneﬁts. There is also a lot of discussion
about residualisation in relation to public housing: housing associations are only
allowed to rent cheap housing to lower income groups, not to households with
middle or higher incomes. Middle groups in particular face the risk of falling
between two stools with measures of this nature: they have less protection from
the welfare state, but are also less able to take care of themselves than people in the
higher social segment.
This was also the conclusion reached in a number of studies by the Netherlands
Institute for Social Research (scp) on the subject of ‘who proﬁts from the govern-
ment’. The government contributes greatly to increased equality through social
security and through taxes and social insurance contributions. If we look solely at
the secondary income of households, the higher-income groups pay more and
receive less. The opposite applies for lower-income groups. However, the picture
changes if we look at the proﬁt households derive from various government provi-
sions and services (the tertiary income). According to Olsthoorn et al. (2017), in
relative terms, middle-income households beneﬁt least from various government
provisions and services. Figure 1.2 below shows how much the various income
groups proﬁt from government provisions and services or pay in taxes on average.
The black line in the ﬁgure shows the net proﬁt of households (provisions and
services received less taxes paid). The net proﬁt is smaller for the middle-income
groups (particularly the fourth to seventh deciles) than for either the lower or
higher-income groups. People with lower incomes proﬁt most from some services
and provisions (such as health care and social support), while they also pay a
smaller excess for health costs and receive a health-care allowance. The higher-
income groups beneﬁt most from other services and provisions (education and
culture, but also the tax treatment of owner-occupied homes). In other words,
there is a Squeeze on the middle, as the title of an earlier study by the scp on this
subject put it (Pommer 2011).
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Figure 1.2 Balance of tertiary transfers to households, by deciles of secondary income*,
2014 (average amount in euros per household)
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* The points on the black line show the net proﬁt per decile, i.e., the proﬁt (positive transfers) less
the cost (negative transfers). The line joining these points visualises the form of redistribution.
Source: Olsthoorn et al. (2017: 195)
Vulnerability and complexity of primary relationships
A fourth trend affecting the middle groups is the increased complexity and vulner-
ability of primary relationships. Within a relatively short space of time the
Netherlands has made the transition from a traditional single breadwinner society
to a dual-earner social model in which both partners combine career and care. Bal-
ancing two careers and dividing care tasks is often a complex challenge and is not
without risks (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995, 2002). A greater diversity of house-
holds has also emerged; there are now more single-person households and fewer
comprising couples with children. In the last few decades the proportion of house-
holds comprising couples with children still living at home has fallen sharply,
from 44% in 1981 to 28% in 2010, while the proportion of single-person house-
holds rose from 22% to 36% in the same period (Bucx 2011: 36).
The income position of households is closely connected with the type of house-
hold. Households in the higher-income groups usually comprise cohabiting part-
ners or families with children and they often have multiple incomes from work;
members of lower-income groups are relatively more often single or single parents
and are in both cases single earners. However, this also means that people with
higher and middle incomes are more vulnerable to the ﬁnancial risk of divorce.
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Research has shown that the number of divorces in the Netherlands rose sharply
from the 1960s, but has remained fairly stable since the 1990s. The total number of
broken relationships did rise, however, because of an increase in the number of
unmarried cohabiting couples who separated (Statistics Netherlands (cbs) 2009).
Furthermore, divorce was formerly more common among higher-status groups,
but nowadays is actually more common among lower-status groups.
A number of studies (De Graaf and Kalmijn 2006; Bucx 2011) have shown a nega-
tive correlation between a higher level of education and divorce: people with a
lower level of education are more likely to divorce than the more highly educated.
Recent research by Statistics Netherlands (cbs) showed that this applies not just
for married couples, but for all cohabiting couples. In the lowest-income group
(ﬁrst quintile), 4.5% of all couples (with at least one child) separated within one
year. In the highest-income group (ﬁfth quintile), the ﬁgure was 1.4% (ﬁgures for
2014) (Statistics Netherlands (cbs) 2016a). Figure 1.3 shows the chance of a rela-
tionship ending for different income groups. In the ﬁgure the lowest-income
group is the reference category (the chance is set at one for that group). The proba-
bility of a relationship ending is only half as great in the highest-income group as in
the lowest-income group. For the middle-income groups, the chance of a relation-
ship ending falls between the two extremes, but is signiﬁcantly smaller than in the
lowest-income group (Statistics Netherlands (cbs) 2016b). These outcomes are in
line with Salverda’s (2017) ﬁnding that households in lower-income groups are
usually smaller and are more frequently single-person households. Nevertheless, a
separation or divorce represents a serious ﬁnancial risk for people with intermedi-
ate education, perhaps even more so than for people with higher education,
because in the latter households each partner will often be earning well and will
therefore be less dependent on the other partner’s income.
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Figure 1.3 Chance of a relationship ending* in the Netherlands, by level of income (odds
ratios, corrected for various other characteristics of persons**)
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* Number of couples (married or unmarried) living at the same address on 1 January 2014 who were
no longer doing so on 31 December of the same year.
** Corrected for differences in age, ethnic background, married or otherwise, children or no children,
type of home (rented or owned), size of municipality and location of home (a new housing estate
or otherwise).
Source: Statistics Netherlands (cbs) (2016b)
1 .5 policy directions:  reducing insecurity,
strengthening resilience and predictability
The ﬁndings presented here paint an ambivalent picture. Looking at the develop-
ment of the social middle groups through the lenses of education, occupation and
income, we ﬁnd stability, but also some threatening trends. Groups in the middle
have been confronted with greater insecurity in the last few decades. The institu-
tional changes that are occurring in the labour market, education, the welfare state
and the family are undermining routines and expectations that used to be taken for
granted. Greater demands are being made on the capacity of citizens to cope with
change and uncertainty. They are being called upon to accept more personal
responsibility, enhance their employability, and above all demonstrate their
capacity for improvisation. In that context, Boutellier (2011) refers to “the impro-
vising society”. Another impression to emerge is that of ‘a liquid society’ in which
stable institutions are making way for looser network relationships, which com-
plicate long-term commitments11 and feed the fear of being unable to keep up
(Bauman 2005, 2007).12 Institutional changes are occurring so rapidly that people
have fewer prescribed behavioural patterns. A similar point was made in an earlier
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study by The Netherlands Scientiﬁc Council for Government Policy (wrr),
Towards a learning economy (The Netherlands Scientiﬁc Council for Government
Policy (wrr) 2013). In an economy based on the circulation of knowledge, citizens
at every level of society must be able to cope with new ideas and changing circum-
stances.
Surveying the ﬁndings from this investigation, one could conclude that many mid-
dle groups in the Netherlands are equipped to meet the modern demands of
employability and resilience. They are capable of delivering status work in order to
maintain their position. However, to paraphrase Salverda, they have to keep run-
ning faster to stand still (Salverda 2016). That is the impression of the stable middle
that emerges from this study. But that having to run faster is accompanied by feel-
ings of insecurity about people’s own position and that of their children.
However, there is a particular sub-segment in the social middle that is unable to
attain a stable position. This vulnerable segment consists mainly of people with
mbo qualiﬁcations in routine administrative jobs or in occupations in the care or
service sector. These individuals have a greater chance of losing their job or are
more likely to be earning a low income. Without additional income, for example
due to the loss of a partner or the partner’s loss of his or her job, downward social
mobility will ensue. This is the picture of the ‘vulnerable middle’. As far as mem-
bers of this category are concerned, there is a clear relationship between socio-eco-
nomic vulnerability and feelings of insecurity about their own position.
The threats and uncertainties facing groups in the middle segment of society jus-
tify a policy aimed at reducing insecurity (see Van Lieshout 2016: 25; Kremer et al.
2017). We provide a general outline of four policy directions for responding to the
institutional changes confronting the middle segment of society as outlined above:
(a) promoting greater security in the labour market; (b) investing in education and
training to enable the middle groups to keep pace with change; (c) preserving the
redistributive effect of the Dutch welfare state; and (d) providing support for fami-
lies under pressure.
Underlying these policy directions is a more general vision of the challenges facing
the government in contemporary society. The policy challenge lies in reforming
institutions so that they can provide citizens with greater certainty, and where
necessary the support they need, while at the same time strengthening the resil-
ience of citizens; in other words, equipping them to function effectively in a more
ﬂexible labour market and to shape their own lives. Reducing a number of insecuri-
ties and strengthening the resilience of citizens will help to increase people’s
capacity to shape the course of their own lives (Van Lieshout 2016).13 Herein also
lies the social and economic signiﬁcance of middle groups: the capacity to look
ahead, to defer satisfying their needs and to take risks.
3 2 t h e  f a l l  o f  t h e  m i d d l e  c l a s s ?
The policy directions that we outline broadly match earlier proposals made by the
wrr and other research institutes (including the Netherlands Bureau for Eco-
nomic Policy Analysis (cpb), the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (scp)
and the Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands (ser)), as well as other
parties (such as the Dutch Labour Foundation and the Commissie vraagﬁnanciering
mbo). According to those proposals, providing greater certainty does not imply the
reintroduction of former institutions (the bloated welfare state, jobs for life or the
traditional breadwinner family). The relatively stable position of middle groups is
largely due to the combination of a two or one-and-a-half-earner economy, a ﬂexi-
ble labour market and an activating welfare state. It is evident, however, that some
risks facing citizens have increased and that there are greater insecurities. A balance
has to be found between ﬂexibility and insecurity, on the one hand, and predicta-
bility and security on the other.
Greater security in the labour market
Earlier, we referred to the trend of the ﬂexibilisation of the labour market.14 The
proportion of workers with ﬂexible employment contracts and the number of self-
employed persons have both grown substantially in recent years. We found that
this trend affects a relatively large number of low-skilled workers and, to a lesser
extent, also middle groups. The trend of ﬂexibilisation of labour is stronger in the
Netherlands than elsewhere in Europe. Comparatively, the Netherlands has more
temporary employees and more self-employed persons than the average in the
eu-15. It has the highest proportion of temporary employees with the exception of
Spain and Portugal (Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (cpb) 2016:
21; Chkalova et al. 2015; Roeters et al. 2016: 86). Moreover, the number of self-
employed persons and temporary employees grew substantially in the
Netherlands in the period 2004-2014 (Roeters et al. 2016: 86).
It is noteworthy that the proportion of people with ﬂexible work has not declined
with the economic recovery and the reduction in unemployment in the
Netherlands, but has actually grown further. According to the Netherlands Bureau
for Economic Policy Analysis (cpb), the cause of this increase is not so much the
preferences of working persons (many people with ﬂexible work would actually
prefer a permanent job or a job with a regular number of working hours) or domi-
nant economic developments such as globalisation and automation, since those
processes are also occurring elsewhere in Europe and are not leading to greater
ﬂexibilisation of the labour markets in those countries. cpb argues that the exten-
sive ﬂexibilisation of the labour market in the Netherlands is mainly due to the
existing institutional arrangements, such as the wide disparity in the degree of
protection afforded to people with permanent contracts and those with ﬂexible
contracts. The ﬁnancial coverage provided in the event of an employee’s illness
and incapacity for work in the Netherlands (the ﬁrst two years are paid by employ-
ers) also deters employers from hiring people on a permanent basis.
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Chkalova et al. (2015: 134) point out that countries with strong protection against
the dismissal of permanent employees (such as the Netherlands and Portugal) have
far more temporary workers than countries where there is less protection for per-
manent employees (such as the United Kingdom and Ireland). However, De Beer
and Verhulp (2017) concluded in a recent report about ﬂexible work that there is
“no systematic connection whatsoever between the number of temporary jobs
and the difference in protection against dismissal”.
Political and public support for providing greater certainty for citizens in the
labour market is growing. Practically every Dutch political party called in their
recent election manifesto for the government to encourage employers to provide
more permanent contracts and to make less use of ﬂexible workers. The principal
argument is that work should only be performed on a ﬂexible basis if it is appropri-
ate to the nature of the work. It is logical that temporary employees or self-
employed persons should be used in the making of a ﬁlm, for example, but far less
so in the care services or cleaning sectors, where continuity and predictability are
important (Kremer et al. 2017). Various measures could be taken to curb the ﬂexibi-
lisation of labour, such as reducing the legal, ﬁnancial and ﬁscal discrepancies
between permanent employment contracts and contracts with self-employed per-
sons and people with temporary contracts, or rewarding companies which pro-
vide job security (by offering those employers a bonus in the form of a reduction
of their social insurance contributions, for example). Or, for example, the national
government and local authorities could set a good example by not making price
the sole criterion when awarding contracts, but also considering working condi-
tions.
Nevertheless, there will always be some forms of ﬂexible labour. New certainties
are therefore needed for citizens. In the short term they could be provided through
measures such as agreeing minimum rates for self-employed persons or introduc-
ing collective insurance for incapacity for work. In the longer term, there needs to
be a fundamental debate about a new system of social security covering every form
of work, regardless of the type of contract. In that context, we could learn from
experiences in other countries.
Investment in education and training
Education and training are for various reasons relevant policy areas for measures to
strengthen the position of and social opportunities for middle groups. Firstly, citi-
zens have to be properly equipped to function in the ﬂexible society of the 21st cen-
tury. The greater volatility and risks of contemporary society call for resilient citi-
zens who are capable of adapting to changing circumstances. The aspect of social
resilience recalls the wrr’s appeal in its report Towards a learning economy (2013:
14) for educational reform in the Netherlands with a focus on “(...) teaching chil-
dren and adults 21st century skills (learning to learn, showing initiative, persever-
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ance, cooperation, etc.)”. This recommendation was based among other things on
the oecd’s ﬁnding that such 21st-century skills receive too little attention in con-
temporary education (Ananiadou 2009).
Secondly, these skills are of strategic importance for groups in the middle segment
of society. We saw that people with intermediate education face tough competi-
tion in the labour market from more high-skilled workers and therefore have a par-
ticular need for education and training to enable them to compete with more high-
skilled workers, for example by improving their it skills (The Economist 2017). An
important aspect of that is more investment in on-the-job learning. There is a task
here for employers.
Thirdly, lifelong learning15 is imperative if middle groups are to keep their knowl-
edge and skills up to date.16 A survey by Statistics Netherlands (cbs) showed that
participation in lifelong learning activities is mainly conﬁned to a select group of
the Dutch population, speciﬁcally high-skilled people working in professions
where permanent education is mandatory, such as lawyers, general practitioners,
psychologists, medical specialists and physiotherapists (Pleijers and Hartgers 2016:
12). Accordingly, the Social and Economic Council (ser) (2017) called in a recent
advisory report for permanent learning and personal development to become
automatic for low-skilled workers and people with intermediate education
throughout their careers (see also the Commissie vraagﬁnanciering mbo 2017). One
of the ser’s suggestions in that report was the introduction of a tax-friendly ‘per-
sonal development account’ in which workers could save for a programme of activ-
ities dedicated to their personal development. Employers, the training and devel-
opment funds (o&o funds) of individual sectors, public authorities and the work-
ers themselves would be able to save money in that account, which could then be
used to pay for a development programme of their own choice.17 This proposal ﬁts
in with an earlier proposal by cpb to provide workers with a secondary education
with vouchers that they could use to ‘upgrade’ their skills and/or to provide tax
breaks for employers that facilitate additional training or retraining for members of
their workforce with intermediate education (Van den Berge and Ter Weel 2015:
15).
Preserve the redistributive effect of the welfare state
The redistributive effect of the welfare state is important for preventing the con-
traction and decline of the middle segment of society in the Netherlands. If one
looks exclusively at what people with a middle income earn in the market, what
can be seen is that their numbers and their share of aggregate income have declined
sharply. This contraction of the middle segment is largely negated by the redistrib-
utive effect of the Dutch welfare state and by the fact that middle and higher-
income groups usually have larger households as well as multiple incomes.
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Preserving the redistributive effect of the Dutch welfare state could conﬂict with
the basic principle behind the existing policy of delegating more responsibility to
individuals. If, for example, the government insists that citizens should pay a
higher personal contribution for certain provisions and services (education, health
care, housing), but compensates people with lower incomes through allowances
(health-care allowance, rent allowance, supplementary student grants for children
of parents with a low income), in relative terms the negative effect of such meas-
ures will be most severe on middle-income groups (particularly lower middle-
income households). After all, people with the lowest incomes are compensated
for the higher personal contributions with allowances and the personal contribu-
tions have relatively little impact on the households with the highest incomes. It is
on the middle-income groups that the costs of education, health care and housing
have the greatest relative impact.
That applies not only for the expenditure, but also for the incomes of middle-
income households. For example, the gradual reduction of the maximum duration
of entitlement to unemployment beneﬁt from three to two years is more disad-
vantageous for the middle-income group than for other income groups because
households in the lowest income group (particularly single earners) quickly fall
below the welfare threshold when their unemployment beneﬁts end and therefore
become eligible for national assistance. That does not apply for households in the
middle-income group, particularly for households with more than one breadwin-
ner. The income of those households falls sharply when unemployment beneﬁt
ends because they are not entitled to national assistance if one of the partners in
the household has an income. Although that also applies for households in the
highest income groups, they are better able to absorb such a loss of income.
To sum up: thus far the decline in the income of middle-income groups has been
compensated mainly by the redistributive effect of the Dutch welfare state, but
that makes these groups vulnerable to policy changes. The trend in the
Netherlands towards protecting those at the bottom of society í for example with
allowances and student grants –leads to the middle groups feeling relatively more
vulnerable than those at the bottom.
Support for families
An important ﬁnding in this study is that the income position of households is
closely linked to the household situation. On average, higher-income groups have
larger households and usually have more than one income. Lower-income groups
are more often single persons or single parents and, by deﬁnition, single earners
(see contribution by Salverda 2017). Furthermore, the income dynamics of house-
holds are often related to their changing composition í forming a relationship usu-
ally leads to a better ﬁnancial situation, while the break-up of a relationship weak-
ens the household members’ ﬁnancial position (De Beer 2017).
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The existing welfare state is increasingly based on the model of the dual-earner
household, i.e. on the principle that both partners earn a living. This study shows
that combining two incomes is often essential for safeguarding middle-class status.
If that is impossible – because of divorce or because a person lives alone, as more
than a third of the population currently do í it can lead to ﬁnancial vulnerability
for those who are on their own, especially if they have children. The question is
whether sufﬁcient account has been taken of the vulnerability of the single earner
in the shift from the breadwinner model to the dual-earner model. As the wrr
observed in an earlier report, single earners are becoming a new vulnerable group
(Kremer et al. 2014).
Dual-earner households and single parents both face the challenge of combining
work and care. Households in the middle groups that are able to do so adequately
are more resilient. According to the oecd (2015: 37), measures that make it easier
to combine work and family life are “(...) critical for men and women to participate
in the labour market on an equal footing. The difﬁculty of combining work and
family responsibilities very often results in women working part-time or dropping
out of the labour force altogether”. It therefore calls for a series of family-friendly
measures (parental leave, child care, after-school care, ﬂexible working arrange-
ments) to support parents with children. Stable and affordable child care is very
important for parents in the middle segment of society. From 2005, there was a lot
of investment in child care in the Netherlands. The funding was transparent and
the use of child-care facilities grew steadily. But because of spending cuts and the
impact of the economic crisis on the labour market, from 2010 the number of chil-
dren attending child-care facilities in the Netherlands stagnated, and actually
declined, even among the middle groups. In fact, between 2014 and 2015, the use of
child-care facilities declined fastest among parents with incomes of between 130%
of the statutory minimum wage and the modal income (Social and Economic
Council (ser) 2016b: 59).
Child care in the Netherlands is relatively expensive for families. The costs to
parents of caring for and educating two-year-olds are higher than in other oecd
countries, and are exceeded only in Luxembourg and Switzerland (Social and Eco-
nomic Council (ser) 2016b: 48). A large majority of parents í in the lower, middle
and higher income segments í say that “child care is no longer affordable” (Roeters
and Bucx 2016: 20). Many parents also say that their opinion of child care has
become more negative in the last few years, not only because of the cost, but also
by reason of the quality and the countless changes in the funding system.18 This
latter aspect points once again to the importance of certainty and predictability in
enabling households to properly combine work and care.
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Management of expectations
The four policy directions outlined above are designed to ease the insecurities felt
by middle groups and to strengthen their resilience and so help them plan their
lives more predictably. Will these policy directions – if they are ﬂeshed out in
more concrete terms – eradicate the sense of insecurity and unease felt by the mid-
dle groups of society? That is very much the question. The post-war welfare state,
with its permanent jobs and inﬂation-proof diplomas, was a unique period in the
Netherlands’ history (Schuyt and Taverne 2000). Those times will not return. The
capacity to deal with change and uncertainty is an essential skill for the modern
citizen. Policies can help to reduce insecurity, and thus offer new perspectives for
long-term planning and upward social mobility, but realistic expectation manage-
ment is equally necessary (see also Kremer et al. in chapter 3) because the middle
class can no longer take upward social mobility for granted.
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notes
1 See also the more recent studies by Hufﬁngton (2010), Murray (2012), Parker (2013), Madland
(2015) and Putnam (2015). There is a broad consensus in America that the labour market and
the income position of the middle classes has deteriorated in the last three decades. It is also
assumed that the weaker position of the middle classes has a negative impact on public par-
ticipation in civil society and leads to diminished trust in politics.
2 See also Van Lieshout (2016: 10-11) who, writing about the Netherlands, refers to a shift away
from ‘rising expectations’ towards ‘fear of falling’.
3 International comparative research in fact shows that there are wide disparities between
countries in the extent to which their citizens feel economically uncertain. Important factors
are the country’s level of economic prosperity and the comprehensiveness of the social pro-
tection provided by the welfare state. That research has shown that feelings of socio-eco-
nomic insecurity are at a relatively low level in the Netherlands (Mau et al. 2012).
4 See W. Salverda and E. de Jong (2017) The Dutch middle class in times of income inequality
1990-2014: The crucial rise of dual earners. aias Working Paper 171. March 2017.
5 The calculation of the wealth of households is based on the method commonly used by Sta-
tistics Netherlands (cbs), which includes a person’s own home as a household asset, but not
their pension savings. The rationale behind this method is that households do not have free
access to pension savings. This subject is discussed further in chapter 2.
6 According to a recent analysis of societal discontent by the Netherlands Institute for Social
Research (scp), there is a clear relationship between people with a low level of education (up
to and including mbo-1) and people who have completed an mbo education. In that study,
societal discontent was deﬁned as a combination of serious disaffection with politics and
substantial social dissatisfaction (Dekker et al. 2017: 42). The analysis showed that 16% of
people with a lower level of education and 13% of people with mbo qualiﬁcations had strong
feelings of societal discontent. Among people educated up to a higher level of secondary edu-
cation (havo or higher) and with a tertiary education (hbo and university), the percentages
were substantially lower, at 5% and 2%, respectively.
7 Lauer (1981: 117) writes in Temporal Man: “When the future is perceived to offer uncertainty
at worst, the rational course of action is to live for the present.”
8 Schimank et al. write (2014: 32): “Wie ein Radfahrer, der das Treten lässt und dann irgend-
wann, noch bevor er ganz zum Stehen kommt, umfallt, riskiert ein Mittelschichtangehör-
iger, der die Statusarbeit schleifen lässt oder aufgibt, den sozialen Abstieg”.
9 Another trend connected with ﬂexibilisation is the ‘hybridisation’ of work, which refers to
new combinations of entrepreneurship, work and consumption. Many workers occupy mul-
tiple positions on the labour market simultaneously. For example, there are self-employed
persons who are also employees (324,000), pensioners (137,000) or beneﬁt recipients
(53,000). For a more detailed discussion of this, see Kremer et al. (2017: 23-25).
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10 According to ﬁgures from Statistics Netherlands (cbs), the number of self-employed persons
in the Netherlands rose from 641,000 to more than a million (an increase of 60%) between
2003 and 2016. See: https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2016/46/toename-aantal-zzp-ers-
stokt
11 Cf. Senneth (1998) The Corrosion of Character. The Personal Consequences of Work in the New
Capitalism. New York/London: W. W. Norton & Company. See also Zijderveld (1991) Stac-
cato cultuur, ﬂexibele maatschappij en verzorgende staat. Utrecht: Lemma.
12 Bauman writes (2005: 2-3): “In short: liquid life is a precarious life, lived under conditions of
constant uncertainty. The most acute and stubborn worries that haunt such a life are the fears
of being caught napping, of failing to catch up with fast moving-events, of being left behind
(...) Life in a liquid modern society cannot stand still.” Similar observations are to be found in
Buyung-Chul Han (2010) Müdigkeitsgesellschaft. Berlin: Matthes & Seitz (this study was
translated into English as Burn-out society and into Dutch as De vermoeide samenleving).
13 Hall and Lamont (2013: 2-13) speak of ‘social resilience’, which they describe as “(...) the
capacity of groups of people bound together in an organization, class, racial group, commun-
ity or nation to sustain and advance their well-being in the face of challenges to it (...) At issue
is the capacity of individuals or groups to secure favourable outcomes (material, symbolic,
emotional) under new circumstances and, if need be, by new means..”
14 The Mondriaan agreement (an agreement between the trade unions, the employers’ organi-
sations and the government) states that “(…) there is increasingly ‘excessive ﬂexibility’, i.e.
employment relationships of dubious necessity and/or which are designed entirely to the
disadvantage of the employee” (The Labour Foundation 2013: 20).
15 The Economist (14 January 2017) actually describes lifelong learning as the most important
policy challenge: “Unfortunately (…) the lifelong learning that exists today mainly beneﬁts
high achievers — and is therefore more likely to exacerbate inequality than diminish it. If
21st-century economies are not to create a massive underclass, policymakers urgently need to
work out how to help all their citizens learn while they earn. So far, their ambition has fallen
pitifully short.”
16 Examples would be persons of working age who have completed havo or vwo but have never
followed a vocational course (Van den Berge and Ter Weel 2015: 15).
17 See also the call by the Commissie vraagﬁnanciering mbo (2017) for an “individual learning
account”. The individual learning account for on-the-job learning would be an instrument
for everyone in the Netherlands. People would be able to use the money for training and fur-
ther personal development courses with a certiﬁed supplier. The learning account would be
funded from various sources: government, employers and employees. The commission rec-
ommended that learning accounts should be opened when a person leaves initial education
with a basic qualiﬁcation or has reached the age of 27.
18 The relatively high costs are nevertheless an important factor. The views of middle groups
seem increasingly similar to those of the low-income group when they say that they “might
just as well stay at home if the wage is the same as the cost of child care” (Roeters and Bucx
2016: 20).
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2 the middle segment of dutch society
explored: an overview of the findings
Godfried Engbersen and Erik Snel
2.1 introduction
In this chapter we summarise the main ﬁndings of this investigation and supple-
ment them with some relevant insights and ﬁgures, particularly regarding the
income position of the middle segment of society. We start by discussing the con-
ceptualisation and delineation of the middle segment of society and then review
trends affecting people with intermediate skills and in intermediate occupations
and in relation to middle-income groups. We then discuss the political and social
perceptions and attitudes of the middle groups and end the chapter with a number
of conclusions.
2.2 conceptualisation of the middle segment of society
There is no clear deﬁnition of the term ‘middle class’ or ‘middle group’. In the 19th
century the term ‘middle class’ was often applied to shopkeepers or owners of
independent businesses. Independent practitioners of intellectual professions,
including doctors, lawyers, architects and civil-law notaries, were also regarded as
members of the middle class (Berting 1968; Wijmans 1987). In the course of the
20th century the term was expanded to embrace everyone falling between the
working class and the upper class, with a further distinction being made within
the middle class between people with an ofﬁce job and manual workers with a
management position.
From the 1960s it became fashionable to compile more reﬁned classiﬁcations, most
of which were based on a person’s occupational position. Important work in this
ﬁeld was performed by the British sociologist Goldthorpe, whose study The Afﬂu-
ent Worker, written with David Lockwood, was particularly groundbreaking
(Goldthorpe et al. 1969). In that study the authors devised an occupational struc-
ture based on two principles: (1) a distinction between employers (including the
self-employed) and employees, and (2) a trichotomy between a managerial and pro-
fessional class, an intermediate class and a working class (manual workers). This
classiﬁcation, which has been further reﬁned over the years, remains the bench-
mark for academic literature on developments in the occupational structure.
This occupational perspective was later supplemented with approaches based on
the income and wealth of individuals and households, or their level of education.
More recently, multidimensional approaches inspired by the ideas of the French
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sociologist Bourdieu have been developed. We will discuss two recent examples of
such multidimensional approaches here. Both studies show that in today’s
advanced economies the middle segment of society forms a heterogeneous whole.
The ﬁrst example is the work of Savage et al. (2013; 2015), who devised the Great
British Class Survey in association with the bbc. The survey in 2011 was completed
by 161,000 Britons, making it the largest ever survey of social class in the uk. It
produced a list of seven distinct classes:1
1. elite (6% of the population);
2. established middle class (25%);
3. technical middle class (6%);
4. new afﬂuent workers (15%);
5. traditional middle class (14%);
6. emerging service workers (19%);
7. precariat (15%).
This classiﬁcation is based on the extent to which individuals possess three types
of capital: economic capital (income and wealth), cultural capital (education and
cultural taste and preferences) and social capital (the nature of their social net-
works). In the Netherlands, the Institute for Social Research (scp) conducted a
similar survey, which introduced a fourth form of capital, personality capital. In
contrast to Savage et al., scp (Vrooman et al. 2014) identiﬁed six rather than seven
‘classes’ or ‘groups’:
1. established upper echelon (15% of the adult population);
2. privileged younger people (13%);
3. employed middle echelon (27%);
4. comfortable retirees (17%);
5. insecure workers (14%);
6. precariat (15%).
The results of the two studies are difﬁcult to compare, although both refer to the
existence of two extremes (an elite, or upper echelon, and a precariat) with a heter-
ogeneous middle segment (or, in the words of Savage (2015: 53), “a patchwork of
several other classes”) in between. That broad, heterogeneous middle segment is
the focus of this study. Our point of departure is not the aforementioned capital
approach because it has still to be systematically ﬂeshed out (Elchardus 2015; Gan-
zeboom 2015). We do however adopt a multidimensional approach, hence the
focus on people with intermediate skills, middle incomes and intermediate occu-
pations. The ﬁrst two dimensions have a clear link with economic and cultural
capital.
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This study is based on the following delineations of the middle segment of Dutch
society (see also chapter 1).
People with intermediate skills
As regards education, we distinguish people with intermediate education (individ-
uals whose highest completed level of education is mbo, havo or vwo) from the
low-skilled (people who have only completed primary education or vmbo) and the
high-skilled (people who have completed an hbo or academic education). This is a
commonly used trichotomy of levels of education (see Tolsma and Wolbers 2017).
It is also a classiﬁcation that has evolved historically. For older people, a secondary
education meant that they fell into the upper half of the educational distribution
(De Beer 2016). With the post-war expansion of education, however, the propor-
tion of the low-skilled declined to such an extent, and the proportion of people
with intermediate and high levels of education increased by so much, that each cat-
egory now represents roughly a third of the overall educational distribution.
Intermediate occupations
In terms of occupations, we use the egp occupational class scheme of Erikson,
Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979). Strictly speaking, Erikson et al.’s occupational
class typology does not make a hierarchical distinction between occupational
classes. The occupations are not just ranked from high to low, but also by type of
occupation (mental versus physical labour, for example). The point of departure of
this classiﬁcation is the distinction between different types of occupation (or other
economic activity). Higher occupations include higher-grade professionals and
managers, while lower occupations are skilled or unskilled manual labour. Accord-
ing to Erikson et al. (1979), the category intermediate occupations covers routine
service occupations (such as administrative work and work in sales or care), pro-
prietors of small businesses with employees, the self-employed and self-employed
farmers, supervisors of manual workers (foremen) and high-skilled manual work-
ers.
In his contribution to the wrr-study, Ganzeboom (2017) shows that there are also
other methods of ranking occupational classes hierarchically, for example accord-
ing to the average income in each class of occupation or the prestige of occupa-
tions. He also demonstrates that when the various occupational classes are ranked
on the basis of average income, as has been done in some recent economic studies
(Goos et al. 2014; Van den Berge and Ter Weel 2015), the result is not only a differ-
ent ranking of occupational classes, but also produces different answers to the
question of whether or not the middle segment of the occupational structure is
shrinking.
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Middle incomes
In terms of income, the middle segment is circumscribed by the distance from the
median income of households. The median income is the precise point at which
50% of all households (or individuals) have a higher income and 50% have a lower
income. The question then is what the cut-off points are for the middle-income
group; in other words, where is the line drawn between the middle-income group
and the higher and lower-income groups? We have chosen a lower limit of 60% of
the median income, which corresponds with the poverty level in many interna-
tional studies of poverty. (According to the European poverty threshold, a house-
hold is ‘poor’ if the standardised household income is less than 60% of a country’s
median income). In other words, anyone who is not regarded as poor under this
deﬁnition is assigned to the middle-income and high-income categories.
It was also decided to adopt a generous upper limit for the middle segment, namely
households with an income of at least twice the median income (200% of the
median income). The limit was set so high in order to make a clear distinction
between middle-income households and the genuinely wealthy households (see
Atkinson and Brandolini 2013; Vaughan-Whitehead 2016). We further break that
broad category of middle-income households down into four sub-categories: 60%
to 80%, 80% to 100%, 100% to 120% and 120% to 200% of the median household
income. This sub-division allows us to make a distinction between the lower-mid-
dle and higher-middle income groups.
Summary Conceptualisation of the middle segment of Dutch society
Three dimensions The middle segment of Dutch society 
People with intermediate skills Individuals educated to mbo, havo or vwo level.
Sub-category: mbo.
Intermediate occupations Occupations that are regarded as routine service occupations (administrative 
work, sales, care), proprietors of small businesses with employees, self- 
employed persons and self-employed farmers, supervisors of manual workers 
(‘foremen’) and high-skilled manual workers. 
Middle incomes Households with a household income of between 60% and 200% of the median 
income of households. 
Sub-categories: 60% to 80%, 80% to 100%, 100% to 120% and 120% to 200% of 
the median household income.
All of the analyses in this study encompass persons between the ages of 25 and 65
(in other words, persons of working age) and in principle exclude students and
pensioners. The age group investigated was slightly wider (from 15 to 65 years of
age) in Salverda’s (2017) contribution and slightly narrower (from 25 to 60 years of
age) in the contribution by De Beer (2017).
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The heterogeneity of and shifts in the social middle justify the decision not to refer
to ‘the’ middle class, but rather to the middle segment of Dutch society and to
middle groups. A further point to be made is that the position in the social class
structure that people ascribe to themselves is often not the same as their position
in an objective sense. Many people are inclined to regard themselves as members of
the middle groups, including people who are too wealthy or too poor to be regar-
ded as such (cf. Savage 2015: 61 and 90; Van Eijk 2011). Were that downward or
upward self-identiﬁcation not to occur, it might in fact suggest a deterioration in
the status ascribed to the middle segment of society, indicating that citizens do not
wish to be regarded as belonging to the middle segment of society.
2.3 education: convergence of people with intermediate
skills towards the low-skilled
Anyone who has followed the debate about the gap between the high-skilled and
the low-skilled (Bovens and Wille 2011; De Lange et al. 2015) could almost forget
that a third of the Dutch population have an intermediate education to mbo, havo
or vwo level. There is no question of a dichotomy or polarisation in the
Netherlands in the sense of a steadily growing number of high-skilled and unskil-
led people and steadily fewer people with intermediate education. According to
Tolsma and Wolbers (2017), the assumption of a dichotomy is contradicted by the
current educational distribution in the Netherlands. The post-war expansion of
education led to a sharp rise in the average level of education of the Dutch working
population. A large majority of the population, particularly in the youngest age
cohorts, are educated to secondary level or higher. It is just that the number in the
low-skilled category is steadily declining.
In this section we look at how people with intermediate education fare in the
Netherlands compared with the low-skilled and the high-skilled. We compare the
position of people with intermediate education (whose highest attained level of
education is havo, vwo or mbo) with that of the less-skilled (with an education
only to primary or vmbo level) and the more high-skilled (with an hbo or aca-
demic education). We review the development in both the size of these three cate-
gories over the last few decades (1979-2011) and their positions in the labour mar-
ket. Reﬂections on the worsening social position of the middle segment could lead
one to expect that their position on the labour market (in terms of participation
and occupational status) has deteriorated over the years. In other words, the
assumption would be that the labour market position of people with intermediate
education has come to resemble that of the low-skilled more than that of the high-
skilled. We investigated whether that assumption is correct. Later in this chapter
we will also discuss the political behaviour and attitudes of people with inter-
mediate education compared with those of the low-skilled and the high-skilled.
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Size of the group of people with intermediate skills
Figure 2.1 summarises the changes in the division of the population into the three
educational categories over the last three decades (1979-2011).
Figure 2.1 Proportion of people in the Netherlands with low, intermediate and high
levels of education (1979-2011) (persons over the age of 25)
low
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
intermediate high
1979 1985 1990 1992 1995 1998 2000 2003
2005 2009 2011
Source: Tolsma and Wolbers (2017) (edited by the authors)
The above ﬁgure shows the following effects of the post-war expansion of educa-
tion:
– There has been a steep decline in the share of the population with only a lower
level of education: the ﬁgure fell by half (from 65% to 32%) between 1979 and
2011.
– The proportion of people with an intermediate education rose from 21% to
33%; the increase was even greater among people with a higher education
(from 14% to 34%). The rise in the level of education was therefore more
marked at the top end of the educational distribution than in the middle. Nev-
ertheless, one cannot say that the proportion of people with an intermediate
education is declining. At most, their share in the total population is growing
less rapidly than that of the group with a higher education.
– The populations of the three educational categories were almost equal in size
in 2011. The proportion of people with intermediate education is expected to
remain relatively stable in the near future.
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Declining occupational level for people with intermediate education
What does the growth in the proportions of people with intermediate and high
levels of education signify for their position in the labour market in the
Netherlands? Has the increased level of education led to a corresponding rise in
the average occupational level of Dutch people? That would accord with the meri-
tocratic ideal that positions in society are increasingly determined by personal
‘merit’ (in this case, educational performance) rather than on the basis of origin
(social or ethnic origin, gender).
Tolsma and Wolbers (2017) show, however, that the value of an intermediate edu-
cation has declined on the labour market. An intermediate education is less likely
to open doors to senior positions than in the past. There are various reasons for
this. One is that technological advances have reduced the demand for certain inter-
mediate occupations (sales, administrative work, etc.). At the same time, people
with an intermediate education are being displaced by people with a higher educa-
tion who cannot ﬁnd a job at their own level. This phenomenon, known as ‘cre-
dential inﬂation’, means that you get ‘less of a job’ for your education. Apart from a
shortage of senior positions, another reason for this could be that employers
demand more from their staff and therefore require higher qualiﬁcations for a job
than they used to. The effect of this is that people with an intermediate education,
who formerly depended on the middle segment of the labour market, either have
to train up or compete with individuals with lower qualiﬁcations for less qualiﬁed
jobs (Van der Veen 2016).
The increased vulnerability of people with intermediate education on the labour market
Tolsma and Wolbers also show that the labour participation rate of people in all
three educational categories rose in the period 1985-2011, but that the increase was
greater among people with intermediate and higher education than among people
with a lower level of education. In other words, people with intermediate educa-
tion and the high-skilled have come to resemble each other more in terms of their
participation in the labour market, while the low-skilled have fallen behind. Tol-
sma and Wolbers also investigated whether the number of people in each of the
educational categories started working part-time (less than 32 hours a week) more
often during the period investigated. This revealed a different trend. While high-
skilled workers are most likely to have a job of 32 hours or more, it is low-skilled
workers that have come to resemble them more closely in that respect. In contrast,
a growing number of people with intermediate education, and particularly women
in that category, have jobs with fewer working hours.
The authors therefore conclude that the position of people with intermediate edu-
cation on the labour market has become more vulnerable in recent decades. In par-
ticular women with intermediate education are nowadays less likely to have a job
for more than 32 hours a week than low-skilled women, and the average occupa-
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tional level of people with intermediate education has declined more rapidly than
in the other categories. In this regard, people with intermediate education have
come to resemble the low-skilled more closely.
2.4 occupations:  professionalisation and polarisation
of the occupational structure according to earned
income
There are two dominant views regarding the development of intermediate occupa-
tions in advanced Western economies. The skill-biased technological change
theory postulates that technological advances will cause a lot of unskilled work to
disappear and create a lot of additional skilled work. This is referred to as the pro-
fessionalisation trend in the labour market. However, there have recently also been
references to economic and technological developments that could cause a polari-
sation of the occupational structure. Automation is causing the disappearance of a
great deal of routine service work, such as ofﬁce jobs, while globalisation is
prompting the relocation of entire industries to low-wage countries and thus lead-
ing to the loss even of skilled factory jobs in Western countries. Consequently,
speciﬁc intermediate occupations are disappearing. Meanwhile, there is said to be
growth in both the volume of high-skilled work (managers, professionals, techni-
cians) and unskilled work (particularly unskilled work in the care, security, hospi-
tality and cleaning sectors). The overall effect of these developments is a polarised
occupational structure, with growth at the top and bottom and contraction in the
middle segment. The key question addressed in this section is to what extent pro-
fessionalisation or polarisation of the occupational structure is occurring.
The trend of polarisation was ﬁrst identiﬁed in the United States and the United
Kingdom (Autor et al. 2006; Goos and Manning 2007). In later studies Goos et al.
(2009; 2014) showed that this job polarization was also evident in other European
countries, including the Netherlands. They demonstrated that the proportions of
jobs in both the highest-paid and lowest-paid occupational groups in Europe were
growing, while the proportion of jobs in the intermediate occupations was shrink-
ing. In the Netherlands, for example, in the period from 1993 to 2006 the propor-
tion of jobs in the highest-paid occupations rose by 5.6 percentage-points and in
the lowest-paid occupations by 2.0 percentage-points, and therefore the propor-
tion of jobs in the middle segment declined by 7.6 percentage-points in the same
period (Goos et al. 2014: 2515). cpb (Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis) also dis-
cerned pressure on the middle segment of the Dutch labour market. An important
reason is that the rise of it has caused a lot of routine service work, which is often
performed by people with intermediate education, to disappear. Because people
who formerly worked in the intermediate occupations are now in lower-paid jobs
at the bottom end of the labour market, employment and wages are also under
pressure in that segment (Van den Berge and Ter Weel 2015).
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Ganzeboom’s (2017) analysis of the intermediate occupations in the Netherlands
supplements the research performed by Goos et al. and cpb. Ganzeboom’s analysis
covers a longer period (1970-2014) and therefore covers the entire period of de-
industrialisation in the Netherlands. Furthermore, his study embraces not just a
selection of occupations, but all occupations. In the process, he also makes a dis-
tinction between manual occupations and service occupations. And thirdly, he
ranks the various occupational groups in different ways, not just by level of
income, but also according to other criteria, such as the level of education required
or the prestige of an occupation.
Polarisation or professionalisation in the Dutch labour market?
The point of departure for Ganzeboom’s analysis was the egp occupational class
scheme of Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979), a classiﬁcation that
arranges different occupations on the basis of various characteristics, including the
position on the labour market, the place in the system of authority and control in
the production process (salaried employment versus self-employment, manage-
ment versus operational) and the nature of the work (service versus manual). In its
original form the egp scheme distinguished seven occupational classes:
i higher-grade professionals and managers, proprietors;
ii intermediate-grade professionals and managers, proprietors;
iii workers in routine service occupations (administration, sales, care, etc.);
iv proprietors of small ﬁrms with employees, self-employed persons and farm-
ers;
v supervisors of manual workers (‘foremen’) and high-skilled manual workers;
vi skilled manual workers;
vii semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers, farm labourers.
This egp scheme has been used frequently in research and has consequently been
further reﬁned over the years. Ganzeboom distinguishes 21 ‘mini-classes’ in his
analysis. For the purposes of this chapter, we have distilled his data into the seven
original occupational classes.
Figure 2.2 shows signiﬁcant changes in the occupational structure in the
Netherlands, which we summarise here (see also Ganzeboom 2017):
– There has been strong growth in the highest occupational class (I) (higher-
grade professionals and managers, proprietors of large ﬁrms). The share of this
class in the total occupational distribution more than doubled from 12.0% in
the period 1970-1990 to 26.2% in the period 2009-2014. Within this category,
the share of the sub-category higher-grade professionals grew even more rap-
idly (this cannot be seen from the ﬁgure).
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– Occupation class (II) (intermediate-grade professionals and managers) also
grew during the period that was investigated (from 21.9% in the period
1970-1990 to 24.9% in the period 2009-2014), but by signiﬁcantly less than the
highest occupational class.
– The size of occupational class (III) (routine service occupations, such as lower-
grade professionals, administrative staff, salespersons and carers) contracted
slightly (from 27.0% in the period 1970-1990 to 25.8% in the period 2009-2014),
though it is important to note that different trends are evident within this
class. While the share of administrative jobs fell sharply (due to new technolo-
gies), the proportion of lower-grade professionals (medical assistants, auxiliary
nurses, playgroup leaders, etc.) and of workers in the personal services sector
increased.
– The share of occupational class (IV) (proprietors of small ﬁrms and self-
employed persons) declined substantially (from 9.1% in the period 1970-1990
to 5.3% in the period 2009-2014), mainly due to a drop in the proportion of
self-employed farmers.
– The share of occupational class (V) (supervisors, high-skilled manual workers)
declined in the period investigated, although it was never very large. The pro-
portion fell from 4.1% in the period 1970-1990 to 1.9% in the period 2009-2014.
– The share of occupational class (VI) (skilled manual workers) fell sharply, from
11.3% in the period 1970-1990 to 5.5% in the period 2009-2014.
– The share of occupational class (VII) (semi-skilled and unskilled manual work-
ers) decreased from 14.7% in the period 1970-1990 to 10.4% in the period
2009-2014. Within this category there was a particularly sharp decline in the
share of semi-skilled occupations (factory workers), which is connected with
the process of deindustrialisation in the 1970s and 1980s. The proportion of
farm labourers remained the same, but was already minimal in the earlier
period.
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Figure 2.2 Distribution of respondents by egp occupational class in the Netherlands
(1970-2014)
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Source: Ganzeboom (2017) (edited by the authors)
These ﬁndings do not support the supposed polarisation of the Dutch occupa-
tional structure (cf. Vrooman et al. 2014). On the contrary, the entire period
(1970-2014) was characterised mainly by strong growth at the top of the occupa-
tional structure (class (I) and to a lesser extent class (II)). The proportion of jobs in
the lower occupations (classes (VI) and (VII)) declined substantially, and the share
of the intermediate occupations (classes (III) to (V)) also fell. In other words, the
trend in the labour market in the Netherlands is more towards professionalisation
(growth at the top and decline in the lower occupations) than polarisation.2
An economic versus a sociological view of polarisation
Earlier research by Goos et al. (2014) and by cpb (Van den Berge and Ter Weel 2015)
observed a trend towards polarisation in the occupational structure in the
Netherlands and in other Western countries. Both studies were based on a ranking
of occupational classes according to income. Ganzeboom supplements that eco-
nomic perspective with a sociological perspective. On the assumption that the
seven occupational classes in the egp scheme (which he breaks down into 21 ‘mini-
classes’) do not constitute an inherent ranking, he arranges the occupational
classes in ﬁve different ways and then investigates for each classiﬁcation whether
polarisation of the occupational structure has occurred. He reaches the following
conclusions:
– If occupational classes are arranged from an economic perspective according to
the average earned income per occupational class, polarisation has indeed
occurred in the occupational structure in the Netherlands. The proportions of
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jobs in well-paid and low-paid occupations are growing, while the middle seg-
ment has contracted. In other words, the earlier ﬁndings by Goos et al. (2014)
and Van den Berge and Ter Weel (2015) are conﬁrmed.
– If, however, the occupational classes are ranked more on a sociological basis,
for example according to the required level of education or the occupation’s
prestige, there is no sign of polarisation. According to Ganzeboom, the differ-
ence is attributable mainly to the growing group of care workers, who earn rel-
atively little and are at the bottom of the income hierarchy. But care workers do
not see themselves as occupying the lowest rungs on the social ladder; in their
view they actually form a lower middle group. Data on the level of education
and other sociological characteristics of this category of workers prove them
right: in all of those respects the rapidly growing group of carers belong more
to the middle segment than to the bottom of society.
2.5 income: stability and decline
The issue of income inequality has been high on the academic and political agenda
in recent years, partly as a result of prominent publications on the subject (Wilkin-
son and Pickett 2009; Piketty 2014; Atkinson 2014). Their central message was that
after diminishing for decades during the heyday of the welfare state, income
inequality is growing again (see also Kremer et al. 2014). Atkinson (2014) refers to
an ‘inequality turn’ that took effect around 1980, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon
world.
This growing inequality has various causes, including the rise in top incomes.
Other factors include the increased participation of women in the workforce and
changing patterns in relationships. In the post-war decades men who earned high
salaries generally married a partner who did not work or who earned less than they
did, and this depressed the joint household income. Since the 1980s, however,
there has been growing equality: well-educated men earning high salaries marry-
ing partners with a similar status. Sociologists refer to increasing ‘homogamy’.
The wrr has found earlier that disparities in wealth in the Netherlands are fairly
large by international standards, but that income differentials remain small due to
the redistributive effect of the Dutch welfare state (Kremer et al. 2014; Van Bavel
2014). Although Salverda (2014) observed that the gap between the highest and
lowest incomes in the Netherlands had widened, other studies have shown that
income inequality in the Netherlands has remained fairly stable in recent years
(Caminada et al. 2014; Statistics Netherlands (cbs) 2014; Soede et al. 2014). Others,
however, have referred to a “growing problem of poverty” due to lower incomes
falling behind because of the recent economic crisis (Vrooman, Wildeboer and
Schut 2015: 359).
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All the academic and political attention focused on the top and bottom ends of the
income distribution begs the question of how the Dutch middle-income groups
have fared in the last few decades. In addressing that central question in this sec-
tion we consider ﬁve aspects:
1. The development of the size of the middle-income groups and its share of
income in relation to both the higher and lower income groups. Is the middle
segment of society shrinking and have the middle-income groups fallen
behind in relation to the other income groups?
2. The development of the purchasing power of the middle-income groups in
relation to the higher and lower income groups.
3. The dynamics of the income distribution í to what extent have middle-income
groups experienced downward income mobility over time?
4. The development of the wealth of middle-income groups in relation to the
higher and lower income groups.
5. Spending by the middle-income groups: we investigate whether the ﬁxed costs
(particularly housing costs) of the middle-income groups increased in the
period 2012-2015.
As already mentioned, the deﬁnition of middle-income groups that we use is rela-
tive. It is based on the median household income in the Netherlands in a particular
year. Households with an income of up to 60% of the median income are regarded
as the bottom end of the income scale; households with an income of between
60% and 200% of the median income are the middle-income households, and
households with an income of more than 200% of the median income are the top
end of the income scale. In some of the analyses we also distinguish four sub-seg-
ments within the middle-income group (the lower and the higher middle-income
groups and two groups in between).
The analyses in this investigation are all based on data from Statistics Netherlands
(cbs). Data from the Income Panel Survey were used in the analyses for points 1 to
4 and data from the Budget Survey for point 5.
Size and share of income of the middle segment
The ﬁrst question concerns the size of the group of middle-income households. Is
the middle segment of society shrinking in the Netherlands? That would be the
case if more households than formerly fall into the higher and lower income
classes. The effect would be a decline in the proportion of middle-income house-
holds among all Dutch households or in their share of total income. Salverda’s
(2017) contribution to this study shows whether that has been the case.
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His central message is that the size and development of the group of middle-
income households can only really be understood by analysing them in a variety of
ways í on the basis of different deﬁnitions of income. Salverda distinguishes
between three measures of income: gross household income, net or disposable
household income and standardised disposable household income. The gross
household income is the total income derived from market activities (from labour,
enterprise or capital) or from a government beneﬁt by every member of a house-
hold. The net or disposable household income is the income that households retain
after paying taxes and social insurance contributions. Finally, the standardised
household income takes into account differences in the size and composition of
households. For example, a single person needs less income than a couple to main-
tain the same standard of living, but economies of scale mean that the couple does
not need twice as much income. Standardisation allows the income of couples and
couples with children to be compared with the income of a single person.
Although the standardised household income is generally used (including in the
contributions to this study), Salverda argues that it is important to use different
measures of income because doing so reveals the mechanisms that inﬂuence the
development of the income distribution. Figure 2.3A shows that the development
of the middle segment of society differs depending on the income measure used.
The ﬁgure outlines the development of the proportion of households belonging to
the middle segment and the top end of the income distribution (the bottom end is
not shown here) between 1990 and 2014. The following conclusions can be drawn
from the ﬁgure:
– If we use gross household income (in other words, before payment of taxes and
social insurance contributions), the middle segment is relatively small and con-
tracted from 68% of all households in 1990 to 57% in 2014. This can be seen
from the left-hand axis in ﬁgure 2.3A and conﬁrms the impression of a ‘shrink-
ing middle class’.
– If one looks at net household income (after payment of tax and social insurance
contributions), the middle segment is slightly larger and has not shrunk by as
much (from 71% to 66%).
– On the basis of standardised household income (corrected for differences in
household size), the middle segment is not only very large (around 80% of all
households), but is also fairly stable. It is only since 2006 that there has been a
slight decline in the proportion of middle-income households (from 80% of all
households in 2006 to 76% in 2014). In other words, based on standardised
incomes there has been scarcely any shrinkage of the middle class, and what
there has been has only occurred in recent years.
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– The development of the top end of the income scale (the right-hand axis in ﬁg-
ure 2.3A) complements that impression. Looking at gross household income,
there has been strong growth in the proportion of households at the top end
(from 9% in 1990 to 14% in 2014). If one looks at net income, the growth is
already far smaller, and on the basis of standardised household income the pro-
portion of households at the top end of the scale is not only quite small, but
has barely risen. Measured on the basis of standardised household income, over
the years the proportion of households at the top end of the income scale has
ﬂuctuated between 5% and 6% of all Dutch households.
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Figure 2.3 Size and income share (as %) of income groups, by measure of income,
1990-2014*
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Source: Salverda’s (2017) contribution to the wrr study based on microdata from Statistics
Netherlands (cbs), Income Panel Survey
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Figure 2.3B describes the development of the shares of the middle segment and the
top-income groups in the total income of households between 1990 and 2014.
These trends are more pronounced.
– On the basis of gross household income, the income share of the middle seg-
ment peaked in the early 1990s and then dropped substantially from 71% of
total income in 1990 to 57% in 2014 (left-hand axis in ﬁgure 2.3B).
– If we look at the net income and standardised income of households, the decline
of the middle segment’s income share has been far smaller, falling from 81% in
1990 to 77% in 2014 based on standardised income.
– The income share of the top end rose substantially when measured by gross
income (from 22% of total income in 1990 to 35% in 2014; right-hand axis in
ﬁgure 2.3B), but if one looks at standardised income, the share of income of the
top end of the income scale grew more slowly (from 15% in 1990 via 16% in
2000 to 19% in 2014).
– Since the turn of the millennium there has been a slight shift in the income
shares of the middle-income groups and the top-end incomes: the income
share of middle-income households fell by 3 percentage-points (from 80% to
77%), while the income share of the top-end households grew by 3 percentage-
points (from 16% to 19%).
Figure 2.3 does not show changes in the proportion of households and the income
share of households at the bottom end of the income scale. However, the domi-
nant impression is one of stability, although this varies somewhat depending on
which measure of income is used (see Salverda 2017).
Figure 2.3 also says nothing about how the sub-segments of the middle-income
category have fared over the last few decades. Have shifts perhaps occurred within
the broad social middle which, on the basis of standardised household income,
embrace the majority (around 80%) of all households? Salverda (2017) gives an
overview of these shifts, but here too the dominant impression is one of stability.
On the basis of gross household income, the proportion of households in the
highest middle-income groups (120% to 200% of the median income) has
increased slightly, but that effect largely disappears when one looks at standardised
income. The proportion of households in the lower middle-income groups (60%
to 80% of the median) is also remarkably stable, consistently ﬂuctuating around
20% of all households, regardless of the measure of income used.
In other words, the general trend on the basis of the gross income of households is
one where both the proportion of households in the middle segment and their
income share have diminished in the last few decades, while the proportion of
households at the top end of the income scale and their income share have risen.
However, these trends are far less prominent if net or standardised household
income is used as the benchmark. This is an interesting outcome, because it pro-
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vides an insight into the mechanisms that inﬂuence income developments. If we
look only at gross income, the middle segment of society is shrinking and its share
of total income is declining. However, that trend is largely negated by the redistrib-
utive effect of tax and social insurance contributions in the Netherlands, and par-
ticularly by differences in the size of households. Households at the top end of the
income scale are, on average, larger than households in the middle segment and at
the bottom end of the income distribution. Corrected for the effect of taxes and
social insurance contributions and for differences in the size of households (in
other words, using standardised household incomes as the benchmark), the size of
the middle segment and its income share have both remained relatively stable over
the years. It is only in recent years that there has been a slight decline both in the
proportion of households in the middle segment (which fell by 4 percentage-
points between 2008 and 2014) and in the income share of the middle segment
(which declined by 3 percentage-points between 2000 and 2014).
Finally, Salverda (2017) argues that a growing proportion of households í including
many dual-income households with children í earn a higher gross income and
even fall into the ‘top class’ of the gross income distribution, but slip back into the
middle segment after deduction of tax and social insurance contributions and after
allowing for differences in household size and composition. Hence his conclusion:
“… members of the household together run faster in the labour market, but their
household ultimately remains where it is in the class structure”.
Development of the purchasing power of middle-income households
Another relevant aspect is the development of the purchasing power of middle-
income groups in relation to groups at the top and bottom of the income scale. It is
frequently asserted in the media and in the political debate that the rich have
become richer and that both the lower and middle-income groups have lagged
behind in recent decades. The question of whether the purchasing power of the
middle-income groups has improved or decreased in relation to the other income
groups was central to De Beer’s contribution to this study.
His ﬁndings contradict the commonly held view. Changes in purchasing power are
often encapsulated in remarks such as “the higher incomes have gained more than
the lowest incomes” or “the middle incomes are under pressure”. Statements like
this create the impression that what is being compared is the development of the
incomes of individual households, but that is incorrect. The comparison is only
between the average income of particular categories, for example the income of the
poorest and the wealthiest ten percent of the population, at two succeeding points
in time. However, these are often not the same households. A household that is
among the poorest or wealthiest ten percent in one year can fall into a different
income group the next year. The development of an individual household’s
income can therefore be totally different to the development of the average income
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of the income group to which that household belonged in the ﬁrst year. The pur-
chasing power of households is also determined in part by incidental factors, such
as changes in the composition of the household. For example, a household’s pur-
chasing power declines if a child is born because the same income then has to sup-
port more people. And vice versa, a household’s purchasing power increases when
a child leaves home.3 In De Beer’s analysis, individual households are reassigned to
a particular income class every year.
Furthermore, De Beer, in contrast to Salverda, used just one measure of income in
his analysis, namely standardised household income (the household income after
payment of taxes and social insurance contributions and corrected for differences
in the size and composition of households). De Beer arrived at the following ﬁnd-
ings:
– The purchasing power of the households with higher incomes (>200% of the
median income) actually declined in practically every year from the beginning
of the 1990s (with the exception of 1992 and 2007). On average, the purchasing
power of the highest-income households declined by 3.3% a year from the
beginning of the 1990s.
– The purchasing power of poorer households (<60% of the median) improved
year on year. The purchasing power of the households with the lowest incomes
rose on average by just over 5% a year from the beginning of the 1990s.
– Middle-income households fell between the two extremes. Their purchasing
power improved by less than that of lower-income groups but by more than
the higher-income households. On average, their purchasing power increased
by 1.2% a year. Within the middle segment, the situation of the lower incomes
(below the median) improved by more than that of the higher-income groups
(higher than the median). Whereas the purchasing power of the lower middle-
income households generally improved, the higher middle-income house-
holds, like the highest-income households, experienced a decline in purchas-
ing power in many years.
All in all, De Beer concludes that there is no evidence that the purchasing power of
middle-income groups is ‘under pressure’. Middle-income households have not
fallen behind in relation to households with higher incomes, but have actually
become relatively better off.4
Income dynamics of the middle groups
A third development that is said to represent a threat to the middle segment of
society is the greater income insecurity as a result of the increased dynamic and
ﬂexibility of the labour market and the growing instability of relationships. Some
authors argue that this increased uncertainty and volatility is typical of the con-
temporary risk society, which leads to new í albeit usually temporary í risks of
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poverty (Beck 1992; Giddens 2000). A characteristic feature of these new risks is
that they affect not only traditional marginal groups, but also the middle groups.
As Leisering and Leibfried (1999: 27) argue:
“(…) the experience of poverty as a temporary situation and latent risk extends well into the
middle classes, and it is not conﬁned (if, in fact, it ever was) to traditional marginal groups or
to an excluded bottom third of society.”
This hypothesis raises the question of whether a larger number of middle-income
households are now confronted with income uncertainty and have a greater
chance of falling into poverty than several decades ago.5 De Beer’s contribution to
this study provides data to answer this question. De Beer investigated the mobility
between income classes and showed that the middle-income category actually dis-
plays little dynamic. There is a greater income dynamic between the various seg-
ments of the middle-income group (see table 2.1). The table highlights three
things:
– The majority of households in every income class do not change class (the ﬁg-
ure ranges from 58% to 74%; the values shown in bold in the table). Logically,
non-stable households at the bottom only rise and those at the top only fall,
since the former cannot descend any further and the latter cannot ascend any
further.
– Among households in the lower middle-income groups (up to 100% of the
median), upward mobility is more common than downward mobility (27.4%
and 24.8% compared with 12.3% and 17.1%, respectively), while the opposite
applies for households in the higher middle-income groups (100% to 200% of
the median) at 10.5% and 12.0% compared with 15.4% and 27.6%, respectively.
– Most changes occur over a short distance, to an adjacent income class.6 For
example, most upwardly mobile households in the lowest income class move
into the lowest middle-income segment (60% to 80% of the median). And one
in eight households in this lowest middle-income segment (i.e. all households
in this class that experience downward mobility) descend into the category of
poor households (<60% of the median). Such a descent into poverty scarcely
ever occurs from the higher-income classes (80% or more of the median), con-
ﬁrming once again that the trend observed by authors such as Beck (1992) and
Leisering and Leibfried (1999), that middle-class households face a growing
risk of poverty, is currently exaggerated as far as the Netherlands is concerned.
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Table 2.1 Change of income class after a year (as %)
Income class in ﬁrst year compared with median
Income class in second year
Low Middle segment High
<60% 60-80% 80-100% 100-150% 150-200% >200%
Stable 67.0 60.2 58.1 74.1 60.4 68.7
Upward mobility 33.0 27.4 24.8 10.5 12.0 -
Downward mobility - 12.3 17.1 15.4 27.6 31.3
Source: contribution by De Beer (2017) (edited by the authors)
De Beer also ﬁnds no evidence of greater income uncertainty among the middle-
income groups. At the end of the 1990s, the spread in the development of the pur-
chasing power of middle-income households did widen slightly, but it has dimin-
ished again since 2005. This means that more households in the middle segment
are remaining in their own income class. The same applies for young people who
are more likely to depend on ﬂexible work. De Beer also observes that changes in
the development of the purchasing power of households often ensue from more or
less voluntary changes in their situation, such as moving to a new (usually better-
paid) job or a change in the composition of the household (having a child, divorc-
ing, moving in together). Even if there is no change in disposable income, such
changes in household composition sometimes lead to substantial changes in the
standardised income (or purchasing power).
Changes in a household’s purchasing power as a result of changes in its composi-
tion usually have a positive effect for lower income groups and a negative effect for
higher income groups, which again contributes to the previously observed
increase in the purchasing power of lower-income groups and decline in the pur-
chasing power of higher-income groups. To a lesser extent, transitions in the
labour market can also lead to changes in the purchasing power of households. In
particular self-employed entrepreneurs who end their business and start receiving
beneﬁts or enter salaried employment suffer a substantial loss of purchasing
power, as do employees who start claiming beneﬁts.
The ultimate conclusion is that while there is signiﬁcant variation in the annual
changes in purchasing power, there is no evidence that this variation has increased
in the last few decades. The frequently heard hypothesis that the income uncer-
tainty is increasing speciﬁcally in the middle segment is also not borne out by the
facts – not even among young people who might be expected to feel it most. We
do see some downward mobility, however. Between 12% and 28% of all households
in the middle segment suffer a drop in income and fall into a lower income class
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over the course of a year. One in eight households in the lowest middle-income
group (60%-80% of the median income) consequently end up below the poverty
level.
Wealth of the middle-income groups
A fourth aspect is the wealth of middle-income groups. The academic and political
debate about inequality in recent years has focused more on inequality of wealth
than on income inequality (Piketty 2014; Van Bavel 2014; Soede et al. 2014). As far
as the Netherlands is concerned, these publications showed that although income
inequality is very small in this country, the disparities in wealth are relatively large,
including by international standards. Van Bavel (2014), for example, showed that
61% of all the wealth in the Netherlands is owned by the wealthiest 10% of house-
holds. In contrast, the 60% least wealthy households in the Netherlands have prac-
tically no assets or have negative capital (debt) if their assets and debts are set off
against each other.
However, there is also discussion about how wealth should be measured. Statistics
Netherlands (cbs) calculates wealth as the totality of a household’s assets (bank
accounts and savings accounts, securities, a purchased home, etc.) less their debts
(including a mortgage). Van Bavel in the earlier study and Salverda in this study
adhere to that deﬁnition in this study. Statistics Netherlands (cbs) does not treat
pension savings as a component of a person’s wealth because that money cannot
be withdrawn immediately and can also not be inherited. Pensions are regarded as
‘constricted assets’. Earlier research has shown that the wealth distribution in the
Netherlands would be signiﬁcantly more equal if pension savings were treated as a
component of a household’s wealth.7
Another methodological issue concerns the position of the self-employed. For
example, some sole traders (such as farmers) might have a low income but possess
substantial wealth in the form of a farm with land or another business, while oth-
ers, such as unskilled self-employed persons, might have a low income and also
not have any pension savings. In short, self-employed persons are a problematic
category in studies of incomes and wealth. Nevertheless, they are included in the
analyses presented in this report.
Salverda argues in his contribution to this study that the distribution of wealth
among the different income groups is far more equal than it appears from a com-
parison of the wealthiest and the least wealthy, as made by Van Bavel (2014). For
example, the lowest income groups (with a household income of up to 60% of the
median income) own between 5% and 11% of the total wealth in the Netherlands
(the ﬁgure varies from year to year and depends on the measure of income used). A
low income can be accompanied by substantial wealth, for example in the case of
self-employed farmers or senior citizens who have paid off the mortgage on their
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house. The highest income groups (the ‘top end’ with at least twice the median
income) possess between 27% and 45% of the total wealth in the Netherlands. This
ﬁgure also varies from year to year and according to the income measure used. The
highest income group’s share of the wealth on the basis of gross household income
is larger than its share on the basis of standardised income. To the extent that a
trend can be discerned in the share of wealth of the highest-income group, it is
only slightly upward. Based on gross income, the highest-income group’s share of
the nation’s wealth rose from 38% in 2005 to 45% in 2013. Its share of the total
wealth is also smaller on the basis of standardised income, showing a rise from 28%
in 2005 to 32% in 2013.
The middle-income households’ share of the total wealth ﬂuctuates between 55%
and 47% (based on gross income) and between 68% and 60% (based on standar-
dised income), with a slight downward trend in each case. Accordingly, the share
of the total wealth owned by households in the middle segment is smaller than the
proportion of all households that they represent (which ﬂuctuated between 62%
and 58% on the basis of gross household income and between 79% and 77% on the
basis of standardised income during the period investigated (2005-2013)), but the
most important observation to make is that the distribution of wealth per income
group in the Netherlands is far more equal than is often believed.8 It should be
noted, however, that the ﬁgures quoted here are averages for each income class and
the wealth distribution within individual classes is very uneven. The vast majority
of lower and middle-income households have no capital.
The conclusion can be that the disparities in wealth in the Netherlands are smaller
if they are related to the different income groups. Salverda does note, however, that
the wealth distribution is slightly more polarised than the income distribution:
the middle segment’s share in the distribution of wealth is somewhat smaller than
their share of total income.
Fixed costs of the middle-income groups
Up to now this section has been devoted to the income, wealth and purchasing
power of middle-income households in relation to other income groups. But the
ﬁnancial position of households is not determined solely by their income, but also
by their outgoings. The ﬁxed costs (housing costs and other regular expenses)
occupy a special position in a household’s expenditures because they partly deter-
mine how much of their income households are free to spend on other consumer
goods (such as food, clothing and entertainment). The unease about the ﬁnancial
position of the middle groups perhaps stems not so much from the fact that their
incomes have fallen behind, but from the increasing pressure of ﬁxed expenses
(particularly housing costs) on household income. Relatively little is known about
the development of housing costs and other ﬁxed costs of households in the
Netherlands. However, in this study we are able to present data from Statistics
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Netherlands’s (cbs) Budget Survey regarding the development of the ﬁxed expen-
ses of the middle-income group compared with those of other income groups in
the period 2012-2015.
In the following analysis we use a different deﬁnition of the middle-income group
and other income groups from that used earlier. Here we divide all Dutch house-
holds into ﬁve categories on the basis of their standardised disposable income.
Using this classiﬁcation, the middle category (the third 20%-group or quintile) can
be seen as the ideal representation of the middle-income group. In the following
analyses we compare their position and experiences with those of the lowest 20%
of incomes and the highest 20% of incomes (in other words, the ﬁrst and ﬁfth
quintiles). However, the second and fourth quintiles of the income distribution
could also be relevant as they can be seen as the lower-middle and higher-middle
segment, respectively.
The ﬁxed expenses of households, particularly housing costs, but also the costs of
education and health care, are the subject of constant political debate. Due in part
to austerity measures by the government, the costs of housing, education and
health care borne by citizens themselves have risen. One might ask whether this
trend has affected the middle-income groups more than others, since the govern-
ment tries to mitigate the effect of higher ﬁxed expenses for people with lower
incomes and it is easier for higher-income households to bear the burden of higher
ﬁxed expenses. In short, how have the housing costs and other ﬁxed expenses of
the different income groups developed over the last few years?
Figure 2.4 shows the changes in the ﬁxed expenses of different income categories:
– The share of total income spent on ﬁxed expenses is highest for the lowest-
income groups. On average, they spent almost 48% of their income on ﬁxed
expenses in 2015. The ﬁgure was signiﬁcantly lower (just under 29%) for the
households with the highest incomes. The share of total household spending
devoted to ﬁxed expenses increased for all income groups between 2012 and
2015, but by more for the households with the lowest incomes than those with
the highest incomes (by 2 and 1 percentage-points, respectively).
– For middle-income households (the second and third quintiles), the propor-
tion of total spending devoted to ﬁxed expenses is slightly lower than for the
lowest income group, but has also increased slightly for the former group (by
1.3 percentage-points for the second decile and 1.9 percentage-points for the
third decile).
– For all income groups, the growing share of ﬁxed expenses was solely the result
of the increase in housing costs between 2012 and 2015; i.e. the actual rent paid
for homes and the imputed rental value of owner-occupied homes. The share
of other ﬁxed expenses declined slightly between 2012 and 2015 for all income
groups.
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– For households in the highest income groups (the fourth and ﬁfth quintiles),
the share of ﬁxed expenses has also risen slightly, but their ﬁxed expenses
account for less of their spending in relative terms than is the case for middle
incomes.
Figure 2.4 Development of housing costs and other ﬁxed expenses* of households
according to income position (as % of total spending) (2012, 2013, 2015)
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* Other ﬁxed costs: water, energy, telephone and Internet, insurance, sewage and cleaning charges,
waste collection and water treatment charge, government services, ﬁnes
Source: Statistics Netherlands (cbs), Budget Survey 2012, 2013, 2015
2.6 perceptions and attitudes of the middle segment of
society
In the preceding sections we explored the socio-economic position of the middle
segment of Dutch society. The analysis produced a diverse picture. There is no evi-
dence of an erosion of the middle segment of Dutch society, but we do see that cer-
tain sub-segments face some risk of a deterioration in their socio-economic posi-
tion.
The question now is what processes are occurring in the domain of attitudes and
in the political domain (trust in politics in particular). Focusing on these two
domains provides us with an insight into the feelings and attitudes of groups in
the middle segment of society, while recognising that there is not always a rela-
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tionship between people’s objective situation and how they feel about it. Interna-
tional studies show that a stable position in the socio-economic middle segment
can be accompanied by concerns about various social issues and a person’s own
future. The focus groups organised with representatives from the middle groups
produced a similar outcome (see Kremer et al., chapter 3). Many respondents are
satisﬁed with their ﬁnancial position, but nevertheless feel far greater insecurity
and have the feeling that their social position is under pressure.
This section is devoted mainly to the question of how people with intermediate
education see themselves in relation to low-skilled and higher-skilled people. Do
they occupy a middle position or are their views shifting in the direction of one or
other of those other groups? We start by brieﬂy discussing attitudes towards the
role of government, some social issues and how people see their own position. We
conclude by discussing the political domain.
Attitudes towards government, society and own position
Tolsma and Wolbers (2017) show that people with intermediate education have
come to resemble the less-skilled more in terms of occupational status. When it
comes to attitudes, the process is less clear-cut. What is evident is that the relative
position of people with intermediate education has changed. When it comes to
attitudes about the European Union and ethnic minorities, in the last few decades
(1985-2011) people with intermediate education have become more intolerant than
the high-skilled, but still occupy the middle ground. With regard to perceived
health, they also take a position in the middle, while on the issue of government
measures their views correspond more with those of high-skilled people.
Van der Waal et al. (2017) also refer to the shift in the relative position of the middle
groups in the period 1970-2010 in their contribution. As far as societal discontent
(the extent to which a person experiences society as unpredictable and meaning-
less), the views of people with intermediate education have converged with those
of the low-skilled and diverged from those of the more high-skilled.
The analyses by Tolsma and Wolbers and Van der Waal et al. are based on a classiﬁ-
cation into three levels of education (high, intermediate and low), in which the cat-
egory of people with intermediate education comprises people who have comple-
ted an education at mbo, havo or vwo level. However, as we have seen, there are
signs that the position of people with a background in senior secondary vocational
education (mbo) is under particularly threat. Dekker and his colleagues at scp
recently investigated the position of this category of workers in more depth (Dek-
ker et al., 2015). Their ﬁndings suggest that the views of people with mbo qualiﬁca-
tions are very similar to those of people with a lower level of education on subjects
such as having control over one’s future, attitudes towards politics and govern-
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ment and issues relating to globalisation. Accordingly, a gap is emerging within the
middle segment in terms of attitudes between people educated to mbo level on the
one hand, and other people educated to secondary level on the other.
The following table summarises some of the ﬁndings. It shows that in almost every
case people educated to mbo level have more in common with the low-skilled
than with other people with an intermediate education and people with a higher
education. Other people with a secondary education occupy a position between
people with a lower and a higher education. It is also interesting to note that
almost half (48%) of people with a higher education feel they have no inﬂuence
over what the government does. Further analyses of the cohort of people with a
higher education showed that the percentage is 38% among people with a univer-
sity education (Dekker et al. 2016: 161).
Table 2.2 Attitudes about having control of one’s future, politics and government and
issues of globalisation, population 18+, 2014-2015 (as %)
Lower 
education
Senior 
secondary 
vocational 
education
Secondary 
education*
Higher 
education
Control of one’s future
Feeling of having little control over 
his/her own future
40 35 29 24
Feels that life in general is moving 
in the wrong direction in the Netherlands
63 65 56 51
Politics and government
The government does not do enough 
for people like me
51 54 43 31
Members of Parliament and ministers 
do not much care what people like me think
61 64 52 38
People like me have no inﬂuence at all 
on what the government does
70 66 65 48
Issues of globalisation
The Netherlands would be a nicer country 
if there were fewer immigrants living here
51 51 34 26
People like me suffer mainly disadvantages 
from the disappearance of the borders and 
the more open economy
33 33 22 14
Membership of the EU is a good thing 25 28 44 61
* Secondary education is: senior general secondary education (havo) and pre-university education
(vwo).
Source: P. Dekker et al., 2015: 41-47
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In the focus groups that were organised with representatives from various middle
groups (low, middle and high incomes), insecurity emerged as the dominant char-
acteristic of the lives of the middle groups, together with a feeling of having no
control over the shape of one’s life (see Kremer et al., chapter 3). The participants
had less conﬁdence in the future, referring in particular to the ﬂexibilisation of
work, the loss of jobs due to automation, credential inﬂation, an increase in work-
related stress and the creation of new jobs with poorer working conditions. These
developments cause stress and uncertainty and make it difﬁcult to plan one’s life
and maintain a particular standard of living.
A second source of insecurity is the retreating government. According to the par-
ticipants in the study, the welfare state mainly caters for the lower class, people
who have to survive on a minimum income or on beneﬁts. They can claim allow-
ances and subsidies and can be given a home in the social rental sector; in short, the
lower class is helped. The middle groups have to make do with a smaller safety net
and are being given more and more personal responsibility, as in the case of health
care (the higher mandatory excess, more expensive health insurance, requirement
to provide informal care) and education (the new student loan system), which is
making life harder and more expensive.
It seems that middle groups are having to learn to live with greater uncertainty.
That uncertainty leads to concerns about their own future and that of their chil-
dren. At ﬁrst glance this would seem to be at odds with the ﬁndings on the income
position of the middle groups, which show a substantial degree of stability. But
more households need to have two jobs in order to secure that stability in their
income position, and increasingly those are ﬂexible jobs. In other words, the
increased need for ‘status work’ to safeguard a middle-class position brings with it
new insecurities í insecurities that not only relate to the more ﬂexible labour mar-
ket, but also to combining work and care, acquiring one’s own home or starting a
family (see Engbersen et al., chapter 1 and Kremer et al., chapter 3).
Political volatility and trust in politics
Since the Second World War the political landscape has been dominated, and
Dutch society has been shaped, by large parties in the political centre supported by
middle groups. These large centre parties have been replaced more recently by a
greater number of medium-sized parties, and the question that arises is to what
extent socio-economic changes in the middle segment of society have affected the
attitudes of middle groups towards politics.
An important role is attributed to the middle groups in maintaining a stable and
balanced political system and a democratic balance of power. A classic example is
the reference to Aristotle (1986), who took the view that a strong middle class was
essential for stable governance. If the middle class is larger than the upper and
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lower classes together, or at least larger than either of them, there is less chance of
radical political change. The economist Lester Thurow (1984) put it as follows: “A
healthy middle class is necessary to have a healthy political democracy. A society
made up of rich and poor has no mediating group either politically or economi-
cally.”
A strong middle segment of society contributes to a constructive political dia-
logue. It prevents confrontation between higher and lower income groups and
avoids conﬂicts of interest coming to dominate political decision-making. Shrink-
age of the middle segment could cause the political centre to evaporate, thus
undermining political stability. But, as we have seen in the previous sections, there
is no question of evaporation or erosion of the centre in the Netherlands. How-
ever, the socio-economic position of some groups in the middle segment of society
is under threat and a substantial proportion of the population with intermediate
education feel ignored and unsupported by Members of Parliament and the
government (see table 2.2).
The dissatisfaction with political parties and the government among middle
groups may explain why they are the most inclined to switch parties at elections
(political volatility or changeability).9 At the same time, middle groups seldom
follow ideological extremes. It is mainly those with the lowest level of education
and the lowest incomes (incomes below modal) who swing between parties that
are relatively far apart. Van der Meer (2017: 37) writes: “Switching occurs in almost
all social groups, but slightly more often in the middle groups. This ﬁckle voter is
slightly more likely to have a middle income and a secondary education. He is
more likely to occupy the political centre than the extremes.” (see also Van der
Brug and Van der Meer 2015; Van der Meer et al. 2012).
Van der Brug and Van der Meer (2015), like Thomassen (2010), do not see the polit-
ical volatility of voters as a threat, but as emancipation of the voter who votes
rationally rather than haphazardly. Although a high degree of volatility among
middle groups is a sign of dissatisfaction with some of the political parties in the
centre, it does not necessarily indicate dissatisfaction with the functioning of the
political system.
That brings us to the subject of trust in politics. Thomassen (2010) found no evi-
dence of trust in politics declining among people with a lower, intermediate or
higher level of education. Van der Waal and De Koster (2017) reach a similar con-
clusion for the period 1995-2010. Their time series does show that there was a wide
disparity between people educated to secondary level and low-skilled people in
the 1990s, but that in 2010 the difference was greater compared to people with a
higher education (see also Thomassen 2010: 27).10 Recent data for the period
2013-2016 show that trust in the House of Representatives and in the European
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Union has barely changed in either direction: trust fell by 5 percentage-points
between 2012 and 2013, but then recovered again. Trust in politics has not declined
in the last ﬁve years (see Schmeets 2017).
International comparative research also shows that trust in politics is relatively
high in the Netherlands. An analysis of 29 European countries showed that trust in
politics is greatest in Norway, where 48% of the population trust politicians, 47%
trust political parties and 76% have faith in parliament. The Netherlands follows
close behind, with 46% of the population trusting politicians, 45% trusting politi-
cal parties and 53% having faith in parliament (Schmeets 2017).
But these general ﬁgures do not provide sufﬁcient insight into the trend that was
also identiﬁed above, namely that people educated to mbo level and people with a
lower level of education have started to display a kinship in terms of their views on
politics and society. Recent data for the period 2013-2016 – in which an even more
detailed distinction is made between categories of education – show a similarity
between persons educated to primary and vmbo level and people with mbo quali-
ﬁcations when it comes to trust in the House of Representatives and the eu (see
Arends and Schmeets 2015; Dekker et al. 2016, see table 2.3).
Table 2.3 Trust in the House of Representatives and the eu, population aged 18+,
2013-2016 (as %) (N=28,705)
Primary 
education
Prepa-
ratory 
secondary 
vocational 
education 
(vmbo)
Senior 
secondary 
vocational 
education 
(mbo) 
Senior 
general 
secondary 
education 
(havo), 
pre- 
university 
education 
(vwo)
Higher 
profes-
sional 
education 
(hbo)
University, 
PhD Total
Trust in the House
of Representatives
2013 22 22 28 34 39 49 31
2014 24 26 28 42 43 51 35
2015 25 23 29 42 41 51 34
2016 25 25 30 44 47 54 36
Trust in the EU
2013 23 25 30 40 38 54 33
2014 22 28 30 44 41 54 35
2015 25 27 30 44 41 49 34
2016 28 27 28 45 40 51 35
Source: Schmeets, 2017; Social Cohesion and Welfare Survey (edited by the authors)
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Schmeets (2017), who wrote a working paper entitled Vertrouwen in elkaar en in de
samenleving [Trust in each other and in society] for this wrr project, also referred
to the disparities between people educated to mbo level and people with other sec-
ondary education qualiﬁcations and concluded: “however, a more detailed analysis
of people with secondary education shows a clear difference between people edu-
cated to mbo level and people with another secondary education: people with a
havo or vwo diploma. People with an mbo diploma have signiﬁcantly less trust in
other people and in most (political) institutions than those in the havo/vwo
group. People with an mbo diploma sometimes even have less trust than people
educated to vmbo level. It was also found that people educated to mbo level moved
closer to people educated to vmbo level on a number of aspects of trust in the
period 2013-2016. That is an indication that the views of people educated to mbo
level are converging with those of people with vmbo qualiﬁcations”.
The middle segment as a patchwork
The study entitled Gescheiden werelden [Separate worlds] introduced two socio-
cultural families (Bovens et al. 2014). One was the universalist family, which con-
sists mainly of people with a higher education who take a reasonably positive view
towards open borders and the admission of immigrants. The members of this fam-
ily are pro-eu, culturally assured and have faith in political institutions. The mem-
bers of the other, particularist family, are generally less well educated and see
mainly the disadvantages of open borders and immigration. They are culturally
uncertain, euro-sceptical and distrustful of politicians. The authors write that the
two families occupy opposite ends of a continuum and that there are also large
middle groups. This raises the question of how the middle segment of society
relates to these two families.
The material from this study suggests that people with a secondary education
often occupy a typical centre position when it comes to subjects such as having
control of one’s future, government and politics, and trust in politics. However,
the group of people educated to secondary level includes people with an mbo edu-
cation whose views closely resemble those of people with a lower level of educa-
tion. We see the same picture in relation to views about issues relating to globalisa-
tion, including the multicultural society and the eu.
The middle segment of society is therefore is not a homogeneous family, but rather
a patchwork family, which displays both universalist and particularist tendencies.
This ﬁnding accords with scp’s study Verschil in Nederland [Difference in the
Netherlands] (Vrooman et al. 2014), which painted a very diverse picture of the
world views of groups that form part of the middle segment of society. But one
important trend is that the views of some people with a secondary education (in
particular those who are educated to mbo level) have started to more closely
resemble those of people with a lower level of education. We are convinced that
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this is connected with the threats they experience in socio-economic terms and
with changes that are occurring in the division of responsibility between citizens
and the government.
2.7 conclusion: the stable and vulnerable middle
This chapter has sketched the socio-economic and socio-cultural position of the
middle segment of Dutch society. The sketch we have given does not correspond
with many of the alarmist warnings of a threatened or shrinking middle segment
in the Netherlands. Our ﬁndings show that when we look at the educational, occu-
pational and income position of the middle segment of society, what we mainly
see is stability. We refer in that context to the ‘stable middle’. At the same time,
however, we have seen some threatening developments in the areas of education,
occupation and income. We call this the ‘vulnerable middle’. In the following sec-
tions we ﬁrst draw up the balance on the socio-economic position of the middle
groups and sum up the ﬁndings about the ‘stable middle’ and the ‘vulnerable mid-
dle’ (see overview 2.2).
We then draw up the socio-cultural balance on the basis of the ﬁndings about atti-
tudes and trust in politics. In that context, it is irrelevant to make a distinction
between a stable and a vulnerable middle. What we mainly see is that certain
groups in the middle segment of society feel more insecure and that their world
view has started to show greater similarities with that of people with a lower level
of education.
Socio-economic balance: the stable middle
Anyone analysing the middle segment of society through an educational lens will
see that the proportion of adults (between the ages of 25 and 65) with a secondary
education has not declined, but has risen, since the end of the 1970s. The main
development has been a steep decline in the proportion of low-skilled people in
the Dutch adult population.
The same thing is apparent if we look at changes in the middle segment of society
through an occupational lens. If we arrange the occupations in the Netherlands
according to the occupational classiﬁcation by Erikson et al. (1979), we do not see a
decline in the proportion of jobs in the intermediate occupations. Above all, there
is growth in the proportion of jobs in higher occupations and a sharp decline in the
proportion of jobs in lower occupations (deﬁned as skilled and unskilled manual
labour). The proportion of people in intermediate occupations has fallen slightly.
On the basis of this commonly used classiﬁcation, there has been no polarisation
of the occupational structure in the Netherlands (growth at the top and bottom
ends of the occupational structure and contraction in the middle), but rather a
trend towards professionalisation. This ﬁnding accords with the analysis by Ganze-
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boom (2017), which also shows that there has been no observable polarisation if
the occupational structure is analysed in sociological terms, for example according
to level of education, occupational prestige, homogamy and inter-generational
mobility.
If we look through the income lens, we also see considerable stability. On the basis
of standardised household income, the proportion of households with a middle
income is large and fairly stable. It is only since 2006 that the proportion of mid-
dle-income households has declined slightly, from 80% to 76% of all households.
The income share of the middle-income households has also remained fairly stable
over the years, although it too fell slightly between 2000 and 2014 (from 80% to
77%).
As regards the development of purchasing power, the higher income groups, and to
a lesser extent the higher middle-income groups, have lost out in terms of pur-
chasing power in the last few decades, while the lower income and the lower mid-
dle-income groups have made gains every year. We also studied the incomes
dynamics. Seen over a period of one year, the income position of the majority of
households (between 58% and 74%) is stable. The other households rose or fell by
one income class, with a tendency towards upward mobility for lower income
groups and a tendency towards downward mobility for households with higher
incomes. Downward mobility was conﬁned to a single income class in practically
every case. This means that few households in the middle segment of society –
with the exception of some in the lowest middle-income segment – descend into
poverty.
Salverda (2017) also investigated the distribution of wealth across the income
groups. His analysis shows that even some low-income households possess sub-
stantial wealth. Households in the lowest income group possess about 5% to 10%
of the total wealth in the Netherlands. The middle-income households own about
two-thirds of the total wealth in the Netherlands.
These outcomes, which point to a stable position for the middle segment of
society, are summarised in the left-hand column of overview 2.2. However, we also
found evidence that there are some threats to the position of the middle groups.
These indicators of the ‘vulnerable middle’ are summed up in the right-hand col-
umn of overview 2.2.
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Overview Socio-economic balance: the stable and vulnerable middle
The stable middle The vulnerable middle
Secondary 
education
Slight increase in the proportion of adults with a 
secondary education.
Credential inﬂation: the average occupational level 
has declined faster among people with intermedi-
ate education than among people with lower and 
higher education. There has been convergence 
between people with intermediate education and 
the low-skilled in terms of occupational status.
Intermediate 
occupations
Professionalisation of the occupational structure: 
there has been mainly growth at the top end and 
contraction at the bottom end of the occupatio-
nal structure. The proportion of jobs in interme-
diate occupations is declining slightly.
Polarisation of the occupational structure in terms 
of earned income (economic perspective): the 
proportion of jobs is growing in highly paid and 
low-paid occupations, but contracting in the 
intermediate segment.
No polarisation of the occupational structure in 
terms of level of education, occupational presti-
ge, homogamy and inter-generational mobility 
(sociological perspective).
The disappearance of speciﬁc intermediate 
occupations (mainly routine service work), per-
formed by people with intermediate education 
(mainly people who are educated to mbo level).
Growth of speciﬁc intermediate occupations 
(lower-grade professionals in education, care and 
personal services) compensates to a signiﬁcant 
extent for the loss of speciﬁc intermediate 
occupations (routine administrative jobs).
Flexibilisation of labour: there has been ﬂexibili-
sation at every level of the labour market (more 
temporary and insecure jobs, more self-employ-
ed persons). This trend is slightly stronger in the 
lower occupations than in the intermediate and 
higher occupations.
Middle 
incomes
On the basis of standardised household income, the 
proportion of households in the middle segment 
is relatively stable. There has been a certain con-
traction since 2006, from 80% to 76%.
On the basis of gross income, the proportion of 
households in the middle segment has contrac-
ted from 68% in 1990 to 57% in 2014.
On the basis of standardised household income, the 
income share of households in the middle seg-
ment has been relatively stable. There was a slight 
contraction from 80% in 2000 to 77% in 2014.
On the basis of gross income, the share of national 
income of households in the middle segment also 
declined, from 71% in 1992 to 57% in 2014.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the purchasing 
power of middle-income households improved by 
more than that of higher-income households.
Since the early 1990s, the purchasing power of 
middle-income households improved by less 
than that of lower-income groups.
The income insecurity (in terms of downward 
income mobility) of the middle segment has not 
increased. Relatively few households in the middle 
segment fall into poverty. 
Between 12% and 28% of all households in the 
middle segment experience a drop in income and 
fall into a lower income class in the course of a 
year.
Between 2011 and 2013 the middle-income 
households’ share of the total wealth in the 
Netherlands declined from 66% to 60%.
Middle-income households possess a signiﬁcant 
share (around two-thirds) of the total wealth of 
all Dutch households.
Middle-income households devote a smaller 
proportion of their total spending to ﬁxed costs 
than the households with the lowest incomes, 
but the proportion did rise slightly in the period 
2012-2015.
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Socio-economic balance: the vulnerable middle
One important development that is threatening the middle segment of society –
looking through the educational lens – is the phenomenon of credential inﬂation.
The proportion of adults with a secondary education has risen in the last few deca-
des, but there has been no corresponding increase in their average occupational
level. Because of technological developments and competition from people with a
higher level of education who are working below their level of qualiﬁcation, more
people with intermediate education are taking lower-level jobs in which they
compete with low-skilled workers. The decline in the occupational status of
people with secondary education is greater than for people with a lower level of
education. The occupational status of people with secondary and lower levels of
education has converged, while the gap relative to more high-skilled people has
widened.
Looking through the occupational lens we also see a number of threatening devel-
opments for the middle segment. Although there does not generally seem to have
been a polarisation of the Dutch labour market, but rather professionalisation, that
changes if we break down the various occupation classes according to earned
income. We then ﬁnd that there has been a certain polarisation of the occupational
structure: while the proportions of jobs in highly paid and low-paid professions in
the total occupational structure are growing, the proportion of jobs in occupations
in the middle segment is declining.
Another development affecting the middle segment of society is that some speciﬁc
intermediate occupations (particularly routine administrative jobs) are in danger
of disappearing. This development will continue (think of the current reorganisa-
tions in the banking and insurance sector in the Netherlands). Up to now, this con-
traction of the middle segment has been compensated by growth in other inter-
mediate occupations (lower-grade professionals in education, care and personal
services).
If we analyse the middle segment through the income lens, a number of threatening
developments are emerging. On the basis of gross household income, there has
been a fairly severe contraction both in the proportion of households with a mid-
dle income and their share of total income. The proportion of middle-income
households fell from 68% to 57% between 1990 and 2014 and their income share
dropped from 71% to 57%. This downward trend is largely nulliﬁed by the redistrib-
utive effect of the Dutch welfare state and by the fact that higher-income house-
holds are usually larger (and therefore have a lower standardised income), but it
demonstrates the vulnerability of the middle segment. Once the redistributive
effect weakens, the pressure on middle-income households will increase.
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Another development affecting the middle-income groups is the growth or other-
wise of purchasing power. The purchasing power of the higher and higher-middle
income groups has been declining for years, while for the lower income groups it
has improved. Accordingly, the purchasing power of middle-income groups has
lagged behind that of the lower income groups. This relative deterioration in the
ﬁnancial situation of middle-income groups as opposed to households with lower
incomes is also apparent from a number of other ﬁndings. For example, middle-
income households’ share of total wealth dropped from 66% to 60% between 2011
and 2013.
Another threatening development for the middle-income groups is the possibility
of declining income. Most upward and downward income dynamics ensue from
changes in personal circumstances, such as the composition of the household
(moving in together, divorce, having a child, a child leaving home) or work (loss of
a job or moving to a new job). Such changes have signiﬁcant consequences for the
income of households. Between 12% and 28% of all middle-income households
experience downward mobility (in the sense that they drop into a lower income
class from one year to the next). This downward mobility generally only covers a
short distance: few households descend more than a single income class. It is rare
for middle-income households to fall into poverty (i.e. into the lowest income
class).
Finally, we saw that the share of ﬁxed costs in total spending by middle-income
households (the second and third quintile of the income distribution) rose slightly
in the period 2012-2015, mainly due to the increase in housing costs.
Socio-cultural balance: greater uncertainty
This completes our presentation of the main ﬁndings concerning the changes in
the educational, occupational and income position of the middle segment of
society. What we found was stability, but also some threatening developments for
the socio-economic position of the middle segment. These developments also
seem to have had consequences for the views held by members of the middle
groups with regard to their own position, their attitudes on important social issues
and their trust in politics. Some noteworthy ﬁndings are:
– People educated to secondary level appear to have become more intolerant of
the European Union and ethnic minorities in recent decades than people with
a higher education, but still occupy the middle ground.
– People educated to mbo level have become more similar to people with a lower
level of education and less similar to people with a higher level of education in
terms of societal discontent (the extent to which people regard a society as
unpredictable and meaningless).
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– The views of people educated to mbo level are very similar to those of people
with a lower level of education, for example when it comes to control over
one’s own future, views about politics and government, trust in members of
parliament and the eu and issues related to globalisation (including the immi-
gration society).
Finally, in the focus groups with the middle segment of society the aspect of inse-
curity emerged as a dominant characteristic of their own social position. Expecta-
tions have been shattered. Obtaining a diploma and working hard are no longer a
guarantee of a stable existence. Two important pillars underpinning a middle-class
life – job security and the certainty of government care í have weakened. Greater
demands are being made on the resilience and the learning capacity of citizens if
they are to maintain their position in the middle segment of society – and hence
their middle-class status. This report uses the term ‘status work’ to cover that (see
chapter 1). The results suggest that many middle groups possess the necessary
resilience and learning capacity, but that it is accompanied by growing uncertainty.
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notes
1 With the help of an interactive Class Calculator, British respondents could investigate which
class they belonged to for themselves (see: www.bbc.com/news/magazine-22000973).
Seven million people used the calculator in the ﬁrst week after its release.
2 These ﬁndings partially correspond with earlier ﬁndings by De Beer (2015), who also studied
the changes in the occupational structure, but over a shorter period (1990-2010). He conclu-
ded that there was growth mainly at the top. Although the number of jobs in intermediate
occupations in the Netherlands had risen, the higher class had grown faster and thus the
share of the intermediate occupations in the overall employment structure had declined. De
Beer (2015: 151) concluded that, at least until 2009, “there was no contraction of the middle
classes” in terms of occupations.
3 Based on standardised income (as De Beer does), the income of households corrected for dif-
ferences in the size and composition of households.
4 De Beer stresses that these annual ﬁgures for purchasing power say little about the develop-
ment of the average income differential between different categories of households in the
Netherlands. Moreover, there is also a ‘regression to the mean’: for purely statistical reasons
households in a lower income group have a greater chance of their income rising and house-
holds in a higher income group have a greater chance of their income declining. The fact that
only households whose members are aged between 25 and 60 were included in the analysis
could also distort the outcome, because older people often have a higher income than young
people, who are often single (and thus single earners), have still to begin their working career
and are also dependent on temporary or ﬂexible work. Because of this demarcation by age,
every year older people (60+) with a higher average income disappear from the analysis,
while young people (25+) with a lower income, but good prospects of a higher income, are
added.
5 Achterberg and Snel (2008: 64) have in fact shown that there has been no increase in tempo-
rary poverty in the Netherlands in the recent past (1984-2000), but that long-term poverty
did rise, particularly among the lower-skilled and women. scp reached similar conclusions in
a recent report on poverty (Witteboer, Schut and Hoff 2016).
6 This is not shown in table 2.1,
7 See the letter from the government to the House of Representatives of the States-General of
16 September 2014 concerning the distribution of wealth in the Netherlands. House of Rep-
resentatives, session year 2014-2015, 32 140, no. 5. 16 September 2014.
8 In Van Bavel’s study (2014: 83) the middle segment (i.e. the second, third and fourth quintiles
of the wealth distribution in the Netherlands; in other words, 60% of all households) owned
just 23% of the total wealth. In fact, the letter from the government about wealth cited earlier
also made the point that the wealth distribution by income group is more equal than is often
believed: “(...) it is striking that a substantial proportion of the wealthier households are
households with a low income: a quarter of the wealthiest ten percent of households have a
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low income. They are mainly pensioners with a small pension and large capital assets.” (Let-
ter from the government to the House of Representatives of the States-General of 16 Sep-
tember 2014 concerning the ‘distribution of wealth in the Netherlands’).
9 Van der Brug and Van der Meer (2015: 173) deﬁne middle groups on the basis of educational
criteria, income criteria and political preferences.
10 Other indicators of political behaviour are voting intentions and membership of political
parties. Tolsma and Wolbers show in their contribution (2017) that in the period 1979-2009
voting intentions did not change among the lower educated, increased among people with a
higher education and declined among people with an intermediate education. Consequently,
the similarity between people with an intermediate and a low level of education increased. A
similar ﬁnding emerged in relation to membership of a political party. Membership declined
In all three groups, but most markedly among people with a secondary and a higher educa-
tion. As a result, people with a secondary education are more akin to people with a lower
level of education.
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3 insecurity in the middle. on the broken
promises of the middle class
Monique Kremer, Djurre Das and Erik Schrijvers
3.1 introduction
“Traditionally, the Netherlands has been a country with an equitable income dis-
tribution and a large and strong middle class. Generations grew up with the con-
viction that they would be able to better themselves through entrepreneurship or
by studying and working, and by taking an active part in society. Now that the
economy is picking up and the prospect of a recovery of buying power and job
opportunities is gradually emerging, we can once again have conﬁdence that future
generations, too, will be better off” (Ministry of General Affairs 2015), said King
Willem-Alexander of the Netherlands in his Speech from the Throne (Troonrede)
on the occasion of the presentation of government policy for the forthcoming Par-
liamentary session in 2015. If we look at newspaper reports from recent years about
the middle class, the tone is considerably more alarming. “There are no new jobs
for the middle class” (Trouw, 2 April 2014). “Middle class under pressure” (De Tel-
egraaf, 17 August 2016) and “Middle class at risk of disappearing” (De Volkskrant,
20 June 2015). Due to developments on the labour market, in particular increasing
ﬂexibilisation of work and advances in technology (robots!), work in the middle
segment of society is disappearing or declining, and incomes are lagging behind.
According to the newspapers, the younger generations in particular will have an
increasingly difﬁcult time.
But how does the middle class itself experience this? To gain a better understand-
ing of the ideas, feelings and experiences of citizens in the middle segment of
Dutch society, a small-scale qualitative study was carried out to explore this issue.
In the cities of Amersfoort and Amsterdam, six focus group discussions were held
with a total of 46 people (see Appendix for more details). Separate discussions
were held with low-skilled people (preparatory secondary vocational education
(vmbo), senior secondary vocational education (mbo) levels 1 and 2); people with
intermediate education (mbo 3 and 4, senior general secondary education (havo)
and pre-university education (vwo)); and high-skilled individuals (higher profes-
sional education (hbo) and university education (wo)), with a net annual house-
hold income of between 20,000 and 65,000 euros, which roughly coincides with
the thresholds of 60 per cent and 200 per cent of the median that are often used for
demarcating the middle class (see also Salverda, 2017 and De Beer, 2017). This also
produced three income categories. The participants were aged between 25 and 65
years. Finally, within each group we ensured a spread according to age, gender,
immigration background, family situation and work situation.
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In this chapter we report on these discussions, ﬁrst examining how people in the
middle segment of society themselves deﬁne the middle class: the self-deﬁnition.
Who belongs there and who does not? As the government voiced in the Speech
from the Throne, the Netherlands is frequently seen as a middle-class society, but
does the middle class also have boundaries? And what are the key ingredients and
characteristics of a middle class existence? (Section 3.2). We then consider to what
extent the middle class is under pressure. Are people experiencing this them-
selves? It is apparent that people from the broad middle of society are above all
experiencing considerable uncertainty. The participants in the focus groups say
that in order to lead a middle-class life, both partners have to work, while at the
same time there is increasing insecurity on the labour market due to robots, ﬂexi-
bilisation of work and credential inﬂation (Section 3.3). The newspapers devote a
lot of attention to the insecure labour market. But it is above all the welfare state –
once a major source of stability for the middle class – that is a growing source of
insecurity. This is covered in Section 3.4. Finally, in Section 3.5 we bring together
our ﬁndings and list a few topics for which policy could be developed.
3.2 who belongs to the middle class and how do they
get there?
There is a long tradition of classifying middle classes according to status groups
(Weber 1978), professions (Golthorpe et al. 1980), education and cultural capital
(Bourdieu 1984), or income (Atkinson and Brandolini 2013). In this study, too, we
examine the middle class through three different lenses and on the basis of differ-
ent deﬁnitions. But how do people position themselves? And how do they com-
pare themselves with others? Who belongs to the middle class and why?
In the ﬁrst place, most participants in this study do not think it is necessarily logi-
cal to divide society into speciﬁc classes. Imposing difference and, especially, hier-
archy on the basis of classes sometimes meets with resistance:
“You’re put into boxes and that’s exactly what we should avoid doing. To me it doesn’t have a
positive sound – middle and high.” (woman, 62, high-skilled, Amersfoort)
“If you start dividing people into groups, and especially into low, high or middle, it gives you
an unpleasant feeling.” (man, 33, low-skilled, Amsterdam)
When asked, all focus group participants , regardless of their education or level of
income, consider that they do belong to the middle class. In this context, low-skil-
led people frequently see themselves as belonging to the ‘lower middle class’,
while a number of intermediate and particularly high-skilled people put them-
selves in the ‘upper middle class’. Some high-skilled and intermediate-skilled
people indicate that in some cases, others no longer consider them to be middle
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class: “We are seen as yuppies,” they say, for example due to their education or
because they are ﬁnancially secure. However, they do count themselves as being
middle class.
We can observe this in many Western societies. When questioned, very few
people place themselves either at the top or the bottom of the social ladder – a phe-
nomenon that is also visible in a country such as the United States, where people
earning more than 100,000 dollars per annum often also describe themselves as
being middle class (Pew Research Center 2015). In the Netherlands, too, people
usually place themselves in the broad middle, as shown in research by the
Netherlands Institute for Social Research (scp). It is noteworthy that the largest
group actually places itself above the middle (level 7 on a ladder of 1 to 10). This is
higher than in similar research done some ten years ago (Vrooman et al. 2014).
Apparently, people think they are doing well when compared with others.
The fact that people consider themselves to be middle class is translated into esti-
mates of the size of the middle class. Regardless of their level of education, in the
eyes of the participants the middle class is by far the largest group in Dutch society,
with estimates ranging from 60 to 90 per cent of the population. According to the
participants, the Netherlands is a genuine middle-class society. They say that the
broad middle class is extremely important for the stability of society as a whole.
The middle class is seen as the “engine” of society, in both an economic and a social
sense. As both an economically active group and a consumer group, it makes a
major contribution to the economy, and as a tax-paying group it is the driving
force behind the welfare state. Furthermore, according to many people questioned,
the middle class is socially engaged and active in sports clubs, in schools or in vol-
untary work.
“The middle class is the engine, the lower class is the oil and the petrol, and the upper class is
in the driver”s seat.” (man, 45, high-skilled, Amersfoort)
The ‘class that works’
But when does someone belong to the middle class? According to the participants,
the middle class is less easy to deﬁne than was the case in the past. For example,
nowadays one can conceive of more types of different households than just the
classic family composed of ‘husband, wife and two children’. For the participants,
a person’s origins, their background, are also not necessarily a decisive factor. A
majority think that a person’s origins, for example whether their parents are mid-
dle class, have nothing to do with their positioning in the middle class, although
participants with an immigrant background feel that this deﬁnitely does still play a
role. Moreover, in the opinion of the participants, a good education is important,
but does not determine whether a person will belong to the middle class.
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“I know lots of people who are university graduates but whom I would nevertheless just
consider to be middle class (..) People often think they will then have well-paid work, but
that’s not the case at all.” (woman, 41, intermediate-skilled, Amsterdam)
“It doesn’t matter whether or not you’re well-educated. Somebody who comes from a
deprived neighbourhood and is low-skilled can also end up earning a million. Contrast that
with someone who was born in a privileged part of Amsterdam and is well-educated, but
who earns only 44,000 euros per year... what is then high and what is low?” (man, 27, inter-
mediate-skilled, Amsterdam)
Education does boost a person’s chances of moving up in society – we will return
to this later – but securing a place in the middle class is mainly the result of hard
work. The middle class is characterised by a speciﬁc mentality. Motivation, ambi-
tion, commitment and perseverance can ensure that people become members of
the middle class. The meritocratic philosophy, according to which it is not one’s
origins that matter, but one’s own merits and above all the commitment that one
shows, is broadly embraced.
“I know plenty of people who are uneducated and now run a factory. They think: “I’m just
going to do it.” In reality, it depends on your motivation. It’s about wanting something,
really going for something.” (woman, 47, intermediate-skilled, Amsterdam)
Virtually all the people questioned believe that a person’s actual work and income
situation determine whether they belong to the middle class. Above all, being in
work is unanimously seen as being the most important condition for belonging to
the middle class: the middle class is the ‘class that works’. This is also because in
this way, people can earn an average income, allowing them to live a ‘middle class
life’.
“The middle class is the class of the working people, people with an average income (..)
Income is ultimately the most important factor. It determines what you have at the end of the
month, what you eat, what you do, where you go and what you wear.” (man, 27, intermedi-
ate-skilled, Amsterdam)
This fairly clearly deﬁnes the lower limit in the economic sense. Money has to be
earned through work. However, there is much less of a consensus regarding the
upper economic limit of the middle class. For example, lower-skilled people gener-
ally have a different view of where the middle class ﬂows into the upper class than
do the highly educated. Whereas lower-skilled people are quicker to deﬁne some-
one as upper class, high-skilled people often think of top-earners from the busi-
ness world and Dutch celebrities when they think of the upper class.
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The promise of the middle class
Income is decisive, say participants, because a particular lifestyle is associated with
the middle class and that requires a certain ﬁnancial leeway. Members of the mid-
dle class can occasionally treat themselves to something more than just the strictly
essential expenses. The ‘middle-class lifestyle’ can be summarised as the conven-
tional dream of having a job, a home, an occasional holiday in the sun and, if possi-
ble, a bit left over to save.
“A qualiﬁcation, a good income, a pleasant life and no worries.” (man, 27 intermediate-skil-
led, Amsterdam)
According to the participants, the archetypal middle-class family has quite a good
life. This includes a car – ‘a Volkswagen on the drive’ – and living in ‘a reasonably
good neighbourhood’, whether as a tenant or a homeowner. And the middle class
go on holiday, abroad and for preference a camping trip, ‘because then you can go
twice a year’. The middle class have enough ﬁnancial leeway to allow themselves
the occasional luxury: ‘just being able to get a Chinese takeaway without immedi-
ately having ﬁnancial problems.’ (woman, 48, low-skilled Amsterdam).
According to the focus group participants, it is above all typical of the middle class
to wish to move forwards: to be motivated to achieve something, to get ahead.
They see the middle-class work ethic as being one of ‘rolling up your sleeves, get-
ting down to work and going for something’.
“It does have to do with motivation, I think. If you’re motivated to climb higher, you set
yourself a goal and go for it (..) I think that in that way you can go very far in life.” (woman,
44, intermediate-skilled, Amsterdam)
If you do your very best, you can secure a place in the middle class, with a job, an
average income, and sufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources to raise your children, live in a
pleasant home and have a good life. This might be called ‘the promise’ of the mid-
dle class existence.
This promise is accompanied by expectations of stability, as the middle class is
fond of stability and certainty: ‘taking few risks’ and ‘ensuring that things stay the
way they are’. The typical middle-class mentality of discipline and perseverance
aims at being assured of a good position in the future as well. This certainty is nec-
essary in order to guarantee their children’s future.
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“It’s simply a group that is just able to function well and to take good care of its children. A
group that doesn’t want any revolution or unrest. Sort of wanting things to stay as they
are. ...They have the feeling that they want to have an inﬂuence on their lives and how their
lives develop, and we’re going to try to keep things that way. And we’re just going to try and
hand that on to our children. There mustn’t be too much unrest.” (man, 54, intermediate-
skilled, Amsterdam)
We also encounter these characteristics of the middle class in the academic litera-
ture. The middle class looks to the future, favours long-term planning and does
not take too many risks, above all because its members do not want to jeopardise
their children’s future. Or, as Davis (2004) puts it: “Equipped with a drive to
secure their own prosperity and welfare of their children, middle classes are disci-
plined, forward-looking investors.” In this, the middle class differs from the lower
class and the elite. The middle class has something to gain and something to lose,
write Schimank et al. (2014). For this reason, middle-class people are constantly
working on consolidating their position. They call this ‘status work’.
In summary: although people do not like ‘putting each other into boxes’, it
emerges that all the participants in the focus groups count themselves as members
of the middle class, regardless of skills level or income. The middle class is seen
principally as a class that works, which is able to earn a good income, not due to
background or origins, but thanks to commitment and hard work. That level of
income is necessary for people to be able to permit themselves a particular life-
style, to raise their children and to be able to do something enjoyable now and
then. In the words of the participants, “a good life without worries”, but also
“without anything too outlandish”. Stability is of great value to members of the
middle class. Because if “things stay as they are”, this offers the best guarantee for
their children’s future.
3.3 broken promise:  the middle class under pressure
But in the eyes of the focus group participants, the middle-class strategy for suc-
cess is showing serious cracks. Although many people – including lower-skilled
individuals – emphasise that they are deﬁnitely ‘rich’, ‘that they can consider
themselves content’, and that in general they are ‘doing well’ or ‘do not like
doomsday scenarios’, most people say that the middle-class existence is under
pressure. Nearly everyone predicts ‘a shrinking middle class’. However motivated
you are and however hard you work, success is no longer assured. The peace of
mind of the middle-class existence has given way to a growing sense of uncer-
tainty – an uncertainty that has not always been there and that does not meet peo-
ple’s expectations. More than once, a comparison is made with a certain peace of
mind from the past.
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“I think that the Western world had its best time from the 1960s to 9/11 (..) The period of
prosperity following World War ii. And the fact that there would never again be war.” (man,
34, low-skilled, Amsterdam)
The participants often point to the second half of the 20th century, the period of
post-war prosperity in which the welfare state was developed, as a period of cer-
tainty and upward social mobility. Van Lieshout (2016) calls it a period of rising
expectations, with – possibly modest – economic growth each year and the ‘prom-
ise’ that, every year, not only would things get better for every individual, but that
this would apply even more strongly for the next generation. He states: “For
increasing numbers of people, their position in society was no longer determined
by possessions and social background, but rather by individual competences and
commitment.” He considers that around the turn of the millennium, these hope-
ful expectations seem to have given way to a fear of falling, a term once coined by
Ehrenreich (1989).
Particularly in the last few years, the participants in the focus groups have
observed a number of developments that are shaking the foundations on which
the middle-class existence is built. They report that there is pressure on families,
because it has become necessary for both partners to contribute ﬁnancially to the
household budget, and because care responsibilities are increasingly being handed
back to individuals. At the same time work, and therefore the possibility of earning
an income, has become more insecure. These sources of insecurity are explored in
more depth below.
Insecure families: working as well as caring
While people are still working just as hard – and perhaps even harder than before –
the focus group participants have the impression that their chances of reaping the
beneﬁts of their work are steadily diminishing. The middle class is under pressure,
as people have to work harder and both partners need to work in order to lead a
middle-class life and be able to offer the children a future. Or, as Salverda (2017)
describes it in this study: “You have to run faster to stay at the same level.”
“You have to work many hours to be able to remain part of the middle class and to ensure that
you don’t fall back to a lower class. It seems as if you have to work harder and harder for it.”
(woman, 29, low-skilled, Amsterdam)
Low or intermediate-skilled people in particular are convinced that households
with only one breadwinner have a hard time ﬁnancially. They say that single-
income households are constantly struggling to make ends meet. It is possible, but
it does not match the picture that they have of the middle class.
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“With one income, you have to miss out on lots of things. A weekend away, the nice things
(..) The Efteling (theme park) costs quite a bit, so you have to forget that. Then you’re reduced
to the bare necessities.” (man, 36, intermediate-skilled, Amsterdam)
Some participants say that this was not always so: in the past, a family with one
breadwinner could still maintain its place in the middle class. This is no longer
possible, partly due to the higher costs of having children. From children’s parties
to childcare, from the iPhone to the offspring’s studies: because children have to
continue developing to keep pace with rapidly developing technology and societal
demands, middle-class life has become more expensive.
“In the 1960s and 70s, if you were a single man who worked 40 hours a week, you could cover
the household costs, afford a car, and in the summer you could go on holiday with the cara-
van. If you only have one income nowadays, you can’t do that anymore. Everything is being
increasingly stripped away.” (man, 34, low-skilled, Amsterdam)
“In the past, things were a lot simpler: the wife at home with the children, the husband at
work.” (woman, 38, intermediate-skilled, Amersfoort)
In her book The squeezed middle (2013), Parker also reports that families can come
under pressure when partners have to combine their professional career with care
tasks and the family. According to her, this is the result of many women entering
the labour market, while the average number of hours worked by men has
remained the same. However, the rising number of hours worked per household
has not led to greater luxury: due to the stagnating wages of men, the ﬁnancial con-
tribution made by women to the household has become a necessary evil, Parker
concludes.
Insecure work
The labour market is also causing insecurity. The focus group participants say that
the labour market is in a constant state of ﬂux and that it is generally heading in a
negative direction. Many of them see the market as becoming increasingly complex
and exclusive. One low-skilled participant says: “There’s no certainty any more;
the labour market has become tougher.” For the participants, three developments
have brought uncertainty: technological developments (robots!), ﬂexibilisation,
and credential inﬂation – issues that are deﬁnitely of concern to the middle class..
The concerns about technological developments relate to automation and robots,
which are changing the nature of work and in some cases even causing it to disap-
pear. According to the participants, this jeopardises many middle-class jobs. Not
that everyone has personal experience of this, but many hear and see examples of
this trend around them or in the media, for example in the articles with which we
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started this chapter. It is a phenomenon that one can call ‘socioscopy’: people do
not always experience things personally, but they see developments that affect
others, and this also gives them a sense of insecurity.
“The position of the middle class on the labour market has worsened. More and more people
are being laid off because of robots, etc.” (man, 65, low-skilled, Amersfoort)
There are also worries about the ﬂexibilisation of the labour market. “The perma-
nent contract no longer exists,” say many participants. And they also say: “A per-
manent contract is no longer worth anything.” These concerns are not restricted to
the low-skilled.
The high-skilled also indicate that as ﬂexible workers, they have problems obtain-
ing a mortgage, and as freelance workers, they worry about not accruing a pension.
The whole of society is organised around permanent contracts and that leads to
problems.
“You can’t buy a house. Everything is based on the old system. We have to be very ﬂexible, (..)
but with a ﬂexible contract you can forget it.” (woman, 49, high-skilled, Amsterdam)
Several participants ﬁnd it problematic that having a temporary contract means
that while working on that contract, they already have to be looking for the next
job. In addition, some people lose their jobs because their employer cannot or will
not offer a permanent contract. Sometimes it is precisely the rules thought up by
the government to give workers better protection that cause yet more insecurity,
according to one high-skilled person:
“Since this summer you can only have two separate consecutive contracts – a bizarre rule. I
already know that from May I’ll be on unemployment beneﬁt for six months and then I’ll
return to work. That’s how it works now. My employer wants me back and I want to return
too. But they no longer dare to give a permanent contract because of the potential conse-
quences. So that’s the way it goes.” (man, 28, high-skilled, Amsterdam)
At the same time, there are people who say that they would like to change jobs, but
do not dare to do so: they are trapped in their current job because it offers stability
and they do not want to take a risk.
The most frequently cited development on the labour market which focus group
participants say has a negative impact on the middle class is the ever rising educa-
tional requirements for jobs. This makes the labour market increasingly exclusive.
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Where previously one could start in a job without particular qualiﬁcations and
gain higher qualiﬁcations while working, many think that this is no longer possi-
ble. In particular, low-skilled people ﬁnd this problematic.
“Yes, that’s the way it used to work. Nowadays, you really have to study a lot more in order to
get a good job. When I left school with a mavo [junior general secondary education] diploma,
I went straight into work at a bank and I had a very good job. But that’s no longer the case.”
(woman, 48, low-skilled, Amsterdam)
They argue that if academic qualiﬁcations become more important than motiva-
tion and commitment, this means that the attitude of “rolling up one’s sleeves”, so
characteristic of the middle class, can no longer bring the same success as in the
past. It is becoming harder to enter the labour market and increasingly difﬁcult to
ﬁnd opportunities to advance one’s career without “paper qualiﬁcations”.
Even the high-skilled report that it is harder to ﬁnd work nowadays. They can of
course accept work that is below their level, but they consider this to be risky, as
subsequently they may be unable to ﬁnd employment at a higher level. They con-
clude that a good education today no longer guarantees a good job.
“In the past, everything was possible – that was my experience (..) Maybe it was very naive,
but I thought: with a university degree, the jobs would be there for the taking. That turned
out not to be the case: crisis.” (woman, 30, high-skilled, Amsterdam)
The children’s future
A ﬁnal classic middle-class topic is the future of their children. Research by scp
shows that the majority of Dutch citizens have concerns regarding the future of
the next generations. In 2016, 66 percent of those questioned agreed with the
statement, “I am afraid that future generations will be worse off than we are” (Den
Ridder et al. 2016). The focus groups present a similar picture, although slight dif-
ferences can be discerned according to the level of education. The low-skilled in
particular think that today’s children will be worse off than their parents. They
refer to pensions (“I don’t think our children will get any old-age pension (aow)”,
and housing (“you can hardly get a new home anymore”), but also to broader
themes such as reduced social cohesion and more threats to peace (“the world is on
ﬁre”).
The high-skilled and, to a lesser extent, the intermediate-skilled, feel less strongly
about this and have a more positive view of their children’s future. For example,
they think that the young people of today will learn to live with uncertainty.
Young people know that a job is no longer for life, and as a result they will be more
ﬂexible. “They grow up and have a different perspective on things than we have.
90 t h e  f a l l  o f  t h e  m i d d l e  c l a s s ?
They’re more ﬂexible.” (woman, 49, high-skilled, Amsterdam). Participants also
say that the standard of living is only going up. “It can’t be true that they’ll be
worse off. They’re earning more and more, and they’re becoming healthier.” (man,
48, high- skilled, Amersfoort).
Moreover, an age-related effect can be observed as regards the assertion that the
focus group participants are better off than their own parents. Younger generations
(those in their twenties and thirties) are of the opinion that their parents are better
off than they will ever be. This is especially because their parents were able to buy
houses (which have risen in value), whereas they themselves hardly have a chance
to purchase a house. Older participants (in their ﬁfties) are generally of the opinion
that they have had it better than their parents.
In short, in order to be middle class and to be able to live a middle class existence,
the participants believe that these days one has to work harder and preferably have
two wage-earners in a household, while at the same time the labour market is
becoming more insecure as a result of technological developments and ﬂexibilisa-
tion, and academic qualiﬁcations are worth less. That is what all people in ‘the
broad middle’ are worried about. Given the developments in the labour market,
these are worries that to the middle class appear to be justiﬁed (see Chapters 1 and
2 ). If people look to their children’s future – a typical middle-class concern – then
the high-skilled are more relaxed than the low-skilled or intermediate-skilled,
who doubt whether their children will be able to buy a house or get a job just as
easily as they did.
3.4 insecure welfare state
The welfare state has always been very important to the middle class (Hacker
2008; Dallinger 2013). This is because a welfare state offers all kinds of securities
that the middle class needs in order to remain middle class. It protects them against
dropping down the social ladder, for example in the event of unemployment or ill-
ness, and it offers an education system that guarantees that their children can con-
tinue to study. The development of the post-war welfare state has enabled the
middle class to lead a life of stability and growth.
But the question is whether this is still the case. According to Van Lieshout (2016),
the increasingly strong feeling of a fear of falling in the middle class is also connec-
ted with a decline in conﬁdence that the welfare state is still able to offer sufﬁcient
certainty. There is a ‘middle class paradox’ in that, while the middle class in the
Netherlands has become accustomed to – and is even based on – a certain degree of
certainty, the certainty of the welfare state has declined signiﬁcantly over the last
two decades (Vrooman 2016).
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This is evident in all the focus groups. The participants are of the opinion that the
general public is less able to rely on the state and that people are increasingly being
left to fend for themselves. Societal certainties are disappearing. “You’re on your
own,” says one low-skilled man (52, Amersfoort). People do propagate a merito-
cratic ideal, in which reward is based principally on the efforts of individuals
(rather than on their intelligence), but they also expect to be supported in this by
the certainties of the welfare state. They have the impression that certainties
which used to be fairly unshakeable are now looking unsteady. They point to the
fact that one now has to work longer in order to receive an old-age pension, to
higher healthcare costs, and to the replacement of student grants by a loans sys-
tem. There is ever-diminishing certainty in many different areas, according to the
participants.
Less ‘proﬁt’ from the welfare state
Moreover, low-skilled or intermediate-skilled people in particular have the feeling
that it is precisely the middle class that is falling through the net as regards the wel-
fare state. While the lower class, i.e. those who have to make do with the mini-
mum wage or beneﬁts, can apply for grants and supplementary beneﬁts, and can
rent a property in the social housing sector, the middle class is not entitled to such
assistance. Unlike the lower classes, middle-class people cannot count on beneﬁts
or other forms of ﬁnancial support from the state. Indeed, some say that the mid-
dle class is “plucked clean” for the welfare state. The middle classes see themselves
as the group that provides the most in tax, while they are less able to beneﬁt
directly from those taxes.
“As the middle class, you don’t have the possibility of obtaining help or compensation from
the government.” (woman, 31, low-skilled, Amersfoort)
“In every case, you just miss being entitled, although we could also really use the beneﬁts.”
(man, 28, low-skilled, Amersfoort)
“For the lower classes there are handouts. But we in the middle class just miss out on every-
thing.” (woman, 59, low-skilled, Amersfoort)
A number of participants state that they have the feeling of having to work harder
to achieve the same level of prosperity, and that they are not helped by the state,
while there are other people who appear not to work as hard, but do receive state
help. Now and then a certain jealousy comes through, directed at those who are at
a lower socio-economic level, as sociologist De Swaan (1990) once noted.
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“It’s always (the middle class) that is not quite entitled to all kinds of beneﬁts. You hear that
kind of thing. And then sometimes I also think secretly that you’re better off depending on
beneﬁts, because then you get everything for nothing. Of course that isn’t fair either, as you
can’t help being on beneﬁts.” (woman, 56, high-skilled, Amersfoort)
Something that participants see as an important symbol of a middle class that can
no longer make any claims on the welfare state is the abolition of student grants.
This goes to the heart of the middle class life, as the middle classes are devoted to
the future of their children, and disseminate the view that it is not sensible to take
risks. They are reluctant to incur debts and do not want to encourage indebtedness
at an early age. Some people, particularly the low or intermediate-skilled, believe
that this has led to a barrier being thrown up, impeding their children’s access to
further education.
“I think it’s harder for children to have a good education, because of the costs of studying. In
my opinion, it has really become harder because of the abolition of student grants.” (woman,
29 low-skilled, Amsterdam)
At the same time, a number of people with a medium or high level of education
feel that it is to some extent justiﬁed to invest in their children’s education, because
it will pay for itself in the long run: “An education that leads to a better job – that’s
something that you can deﬁnitely invest in yourself.” However, they recognise that
due to the credential inﬂation mentioned earlier, this investment has also become
less secure. This is probably why the abolition of student grants has such symbolic
value for the groups in the middle. Now that the beneﬁts of education are no lon-
ger as clear to the middle class, they are expected, without state help, to take risks
that are not compatible with their middle class lifestyle.
The feeling among the middle classes of having been abandoned by the welfare
state also emerged in previous research by the Netherlands Institute for Social
Research (scp) (Dekker et al. 2015), in which above all intermediate-skilled people
say that “the government doesn’t do enough for people like me”. There is the view
that “‘the ordinary, hard-working person’ is caught between a rock and a hard
place” (p. 4). More recent research by the same institute on proﬁt from the state
shows that if secondary beneﬁts (social security) and tertiary beneﬁts (such as
those relating to housing or education) are added together, people with the lowest
incomes proﬁt the most and those with higher incomes the least (see Olsthoorn et
al. 2017: 16). The strongest shoulders therefore bear the heaviest burdens. It
emerges that middle-income groups (between 25,000 and 45,000 euros net
household income per year), compared with the lower class, derive a lot less
‘proﬁt’ from some (tertiary) provisions in particular, such as housing, higher edu-
cation, recreation and sport. This could explain their impression that the welfare
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state is no longer there for them. Middle-income households beneﬁt relatively lit-
tle from government spending on public facilities that have an important symbolic
middle-class value and that are the most visible and tangible in their lives, such as
housing and education. In addition, people in the lower and middle group seem to
compare themselves more with the lower class than with the higher class, because
middle-class people have to do their very best in order to be able to lead a middle-
class life.
The feeling that the middle class does not beneﬁt from the state ultimately appears
to undermine the solidarity of some participants, who develop the idea that these
days it is “everyone for himself”.
“You get a different mindset. If you have the idea that you’ll get short-changed.. then you
start thinking more and more about your own self-interest. You’re forced to do that. Then
you don’t do what’s best for all of us.” (man, 28, high-skilled, Amsterdam)
What could be the consequences of this? If the people in the middle segment no
longer want to take part in a social security system based on solidarity, because –
rightly or wrongly – they feel they beneﬁt too little from it, this could have nega-
tive consequences for the future of the welfare state. The middle class has always
been an important driver of and support for the welfare state (De Swaan 1989;
Baldwin 1990). Once the middle class feels that it no longer beneﬁts, it might with-
draw from collective insurance schemes and provisions. This is described, for
example, by Skocpol in her book The Missing Middle (2000), in which she attrib-
utes the lack of a broad-based welfare state in the usa to the fact that policy only
targets those at the bottom of society, so that there is no support from the middle
class.
The ‘participation society’
Something else that constitutes a problem in the eyes of the participants – from all
levels of education – is the shift from a welfare state towards a ‘participation
society’, as announced in the Speech from the Throne in 2006, in which the
government stated that people should take more responsibility for themselves and
those around them. Although several focus group participants stress that it is good
to care for frail parents, for example, they are less enthusiastic about the way in
which it needs to be done. Because they are an exceptionally socially engaged and
active group, the burden falls mainly on their shoulders. Alongside their normal
tasks, such as running their own households and any other obligations, they are
also expected to make time for voluntary work at schools and sports clubs, or pro-
vide informal care to parents or others in their area. ‘The participation society’ pla-
ces even more pressure on them, just as they are already struggling with work and
care activities:
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“I get stressed out by it all. At school you have to help out with all kinds of things – compul-
sory duties. That keeps you endlessly busy. I also have to work to pay off the mortgage, and
that causes a lot of stress and bother (..) Subsidies have been taken away from the sports asso-
ciations and you also have to do bar duties there.” (man, 48, high-skilled, Amersfoort)
“You just don’t have any energy left and society demands so much of you. The pressure of
work is increasing, the biggest cause of absenteeism is stress, because we’re all overworked
and we’re constantly being asked to do more. And then you also have to do that (care work),
because they say they don’t have any money for it anymore, and they say you’re on your
own.” (man, 28, low-skilled, Amersfoort)
Many respondents ﬁnd it hard to understand that, precisely in the context of
increasing emphasis on paid work and an insecure labour market, the government
is asking citizens once again to take on the task of caring for one another. Some of
them believe that families are being driven from pillar to post by government pol-
icy. First it was important for people to participate in the labour market, and now
they are suddenly having to go back to providing informal care.
“I don’t think it makes things any more pleasant. We’ve been thrown all over the place by
politicians in recent years. Previously, we were supposed to be more individualistic and just
take care of ourselves. And now we suddenly have to look after grandad again, just when
we’d got used to not doing that! I feel a bit cheated. What’s more: I don’t know how to man-
age everything. To get a bit of a decent pension, it’s essential that we both work. I couldn’t
manage otherwise.” (man, 61, low-skilled, Amsterdam)
In answer to the question whether the middle class is being supported by the
government or left to its own devices, one participant replied:
“It’s all about the engine that is the middle class. You can pour oil into it, but if you’ve over-
loaded it, steering it makes no sense. You have to give it a bit of tlc. The answer is negative.
The middle class has been abandoned.” (man, 45, high-skilled, Amersfoort)
Listening to the engine of society
According to many focus group participants, the government has too little regard
for the implications of policy and its impact on citizens’ lives. “We’re the engine,
but the upper class is in the driver’s seat,” as one participant said earlier. When
talking about the government or politics, people frequently use the word ‘they’,
which creates distance, as well as phrases such as “it will be pushed through any-
way”, “we’re being screwed”, and “we don’t have any say anymore”. This also
applies to the high-skilled interviewees; they too felt that they were not being
heard.
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“I think we are starting to have less respect for governments and the decisions they make.
You get angry about it and think: how can you dream up such nonsense?” (woman, 52, high-
skilled, Amsterdam)
It was stated a number of times that it is important for the government to lend an
ear to society, and speciﬁcally to the middle class that is so overlooked.
“Listen carefully to the members of the middle class. And just listen to their cries for help.
That happens too little to my mind.” (man, 28, low-skilled, Amersfoort)
Many participants consider it is the state’s task to equip people better to deal with
the challenges of modern society and the complex labour market. Sometimes the
view is that people also have responsibility: “Shoulder your responsibility yourself
– why should someone else always do something for you?” But usually people say
the most important thing is that the government should once again be there for
everyone and should commit itself to creating certainty for people who work hard
and are really motivated. If the government guarantees the members of the middle
class a few existential securities, and assures them that if there are problems, they
do not immediately need to be afraid of falling to the bottom of the social ladder,
the middle class will regain conﬁdence in the idea that hard work is worthwhile.
“The government needs to make an effort to ensure more certainty for the future. It should
say that this is a guideline, something that we can aim for (..) Restore people’s trust. This trust
has been broken.” (man, 61, intermediate-skilled, Amersfoort)
The welfare state, which in its heyday was a major source of security, has lost that
role in the eyes of low and intermediate-skilled people in particular. In the middle
segment of society, there is a strong feeling that the “engine of society” is not being
heeded: the upper class is in the driver’s seat. Middle-class people already have to
work hard and now they are also being told that they have to do more in society.
Especially those at the lower end of the middle have the feeling that they “fall
through the welfare net”, because the high-skilled can look after themselves and
the low-skilled are still supported by the welfare state. The middle class is left to
fend for itself.
3.5 conclusion: the insecure middle class
As King Willem-Alexander said in his Speech from the Throne in 2015, the
Netherlands has a broad and strong middle class, which large groups – from high to
low sections of society – consider themselves to be a part of. Indeed, generations
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grew up with the idea that through work and study, you could get ahead. This
could be called ‘the promise of the middle-class existence’: if you just do your very
best, through commitment and perseverance you can win a place in the middle
class, with a job that gives you an average income, with which you can have a nice
home and a good life, and sufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources to raise your children and
guarantee their future. But it can no longer be taken for granted that this promise
will be kept. This emerges from the focus group discussions that we held with rep-
resentatives of the middle segments of Dutch society. The middle class can go up,
but it can also go down. People have to work harder and perform better to stay in
the same position. In other words, constant ‘status work’ is necessary so as not to
slide down the social ladder (Schimank et al. 2014).
Maintaining a place in the middle is accompanied by a growing feeling of insecur-
ity. The discussions do not so much present a picture of a “vanishing” or “threat-
ened” middle class as of an “insecure middle class”. According to the participants,
this insecurity arises because two pillars supporting the middle-class existence are
now shaky. The ﬁrst source of insecurity is work, which the participants see as a
crucial component of the middle class: the middle class is the class that works.
People are experiencing an increasingly complex labour market, in which ﬂexibili-
sation and automation (robots) are causing feelings of uncertainty. Even a qualiﬁ-
cation no longer guarantees access to a well-paid job. Furthermore, two jobs are
now needed for a couple to be able to lead a middle-class life, with all the stress
that this causes for the family.
The second source of insecurity is the welfare state. Although the focus group par-
ticipants emphasise the meritocratic ideal – it is not a person’s background that
counts, but the individual effort and perseverance – the welfare state is still
expected to give a hand. Whereas in the past the welfare state was a source of sta-
bility and certainty, people now sometimes feel abandoned. “The welfare state is
not for us” and “we fall through the net”: these sentiments represent a feeling that
is widely shared, particularly among the low and intermediate-skilled. While the
high-skilled can look after themselves and the very low-skilled are entitled to “all
kinds of handouts”, the middle classes receive less and less. The abolition of stu-
dent grants is for the middle class an important symbol of this development.
What lessons should be drawn from this in relation to policy? The middle groups,
including the more highly educated among them, clearly do not have the feeling
that the government is listening to them. They say that there is insufﬁcient aware-
ness of the impact that all kinds of contradictory government messages have on
their middle-class existence. They have to work harder in an insecure labour mar-
ket and, within the framework of the ‘participation society’, they have to care for
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others. Now that student grants have been abolished, they themselves have to
invest in their children’s education, while it is unclear whether investing in educa-
tion is really worth it. “Listen to our cries for help,” they say.
How could government respond to the growing feelings of insecurity in the mid-
dle class? Do the middle groups have to set aside their expectations and should
they get used to an insecure future for themselves and their children? That would
mean government policy no longer focusing on rising expectations, but instead on
managing expectations. The promise of the middle-class existence can no longer
always be kept. However much you try to do your best, the future is simply not
certain. Or should government try to provide greater security and predictability,
both in the labour market and the welfare state, so that the middle-class groups can
once again enjoy a somewhat ﬁrmer footing in uncertain times? The government
should again be there for everyone and should give people conﬁdence, say some
participants. As is often the case, the answer probably lies in a combination of the
two.
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appendix
For the research on the subjective experience of middle-income groups, six differ-
ent group discussions were held, in which a total of 46 people took part. The
research was carried out by the market research consultancy Bureau Veldkamp
(now Kantar Public), in collaboration with researchers from the wrr. The partici-
pants were selected by two selection agencies. They were divided into different
groups on the basis of their level of education: discussions took place with low-
skilled (vmbo, mbo 1), intermediate-skilled (mbo 2-4, havo and vwo), and high-
skilled (hbo and wo) participants. Finally, within each group we also ensured a
similar spread according to age, gender, income, origin, family situation, and work
situation. For example, in every group there was an equal number of men and
women, and there was a maximum of two people not in work and two people who
were self-employed without employees or employed on a ﬂexible contract. An
overview of the participants’ socio-economic characteristics is given in table 3.2.
Because perceptions can also vary from one region to another, discussions were
held in Amsterdam and in Amersfoort. These all took place in November 2015.
Table 3.1 Overview of the 46 participants in the focus groups
Educational level Amsterdam Amersfoort
Low 8 people 8 people
Intermediate 8 people 7 people
High 7 people 8 people
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Table 3.2 Socio-economic characteristics of participants by skills level
Total Examples of professions Family situation Age Net household income
Low- 
skilled
16 – Caretaker
– Logistics worker
– Supermarket sales
– Self-employed singer
– Administrative worker
– Secretary
Couple without child (5x) 
Couple with child (6x)
Single (3x)
Single with child (2x)
Average: 
44 years
– Youngest: 28
– Oldest: 65
Average: € 2322
– Lowest: € 1538 – € 2000 
– Highest: € 3500 – € 4000 
Interme-
diate-
skilled
15 – Lorry driver
– Occupational therapist in 
the care sector
– Customer service
– Transport, self-employed
– Legal secretary
– Administrative secretary
Couple without child (4x)
Couple with child (4x)
Single (4)
Single with child (3x)
Average: 
45 years
– Youngest: 27
– Oldest: 61
Average: € 2637
– Lowest: € 1538  – € 2000 
– Highest: € 4500 – € 5000  
High 
skilled
15 – HR advisor
– Educational staff
– Juridical clerk
– Sales manager
– Tech. consultant, chemicals
– Tch. cons., orthopaedics
Couple without child (3x) 
Couple with children (6x)
Single (4x)
Single with child (2x)
Average: 
43 years
– Youngest: 28
– Oldest: 62
Average: € 2986
– Lowest: € 1538 – € 2000 
– Highest: € 4500 – € 5000 
For this qualitative study, the focus group method was used: group discussions
with a limited number of participants (preferably 6-8), for which a certain degree
of homogeneity is pursued to enable the discussions to proceed smoothly. The
advantage of the focus group method is that participants can stimulate one another
and trigger new ideas. The interaction that takes place during the discussions
prompts the participants to delve more deeply into their experiences and opin-
ions, which brings about a better understanding of the reasoning behind ideas and
opinions.
The discussions were conducted using a checklist that was drawn up jointly by
wrr researchers and the Bureau Veldkamp market research consultancy. The basic
format was a two-hour discussion. There were questions on how the participants
deﬁne the limits of the middle class and what, according to them, determines
whether a person belongs to it; self-identiﬁcation by the participants; what devel-
opments they see in relation to the middle class; and what they expect for the mid-
dle class in the future. The discussions were transcribed and subsequently analysed
by the authors of this chapter.
1 00 t h e  f a l l  o f  t h e  m i d d l e  c l a s s ?
references
abn amro (2014) Kwetsbare klasse: de middenklasse op de mondiale snelweg,
www.abnamro.com/nl/newsroom/nieuws/verzwakking-
middenklassebedreiging-voor-welvaart.html (seen on 25 March 2015).
Achterberg, P. and E. Snel (2008) ‘Het einde van duurzame armoede? Over ‘vertijdelijking’
en ‘verduurzaming’ van armoede’, Sociologie 4, 1: 53-68.
Ananiadou, K. (2009) 21st Century skills and competences for new millennium learners in
oecd countries, Paris: oecd (edu Working paper no. 41).
Arends, J. and H. Schmeets (2015) Sociaal en institutioneel vertrouwen in Nederland,
Bevolkingstrends, 1, cbs.
Aristotle (1986) The Politics, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Arndt, C. (2012) Zwischen Stabilität und Fragilität: Was wissen wir über die Mittelschicht in
Deutschland?, Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung.
Atkinson, A. (2014) Inequality: What Can Be Done?, Harvard University Press.
Atkinson, A. and A. Brandolini (2013) ‘On the identiﬁcation of the middle class’, pp. 77-100
in J. Gornick and M. Jäntti (eds.) Income Inequality: Economic Disparities and the
Middle Class in Afﬂuent Countries, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Autor, D., L.F. Katz and M.S. Kearney (2006) The polarization of the us labor market (nr.
w11986), National Bureau of Economic Research, obtained on 2 June 2015 from
www.nber.org/papers/w11986.
Baldwin, P. (1990) The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State,
1875–1975, Cambridge [etc.]: Cambridge University Press.
Bauman, Z. (2005) Liquid life, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Bauman, Z. (2007) Liquid Times. Living in an Age of Uncertainty, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Beck, U. (1992) Risk society. Towards a new modernity, London: Sage.
Beck, U. and E. Beck-Gernsheim (1995) The Normal Chaos of Love, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Beck, U. and E. Beck-Gernsheim (2002) Individualization. Institutionalized Individualism
and its Social and Political Consequences, London: Sage.
Berting, J. (1968) In het brede maatschappelijke midden. Een studie over middelbare
administratieve employés in 9 grote organisaties in Amsterdam, Meppel: Boom.
Bijl, R., E. Boelhouwer, E. Pommer and I. Andriessen (2015) De sociale staat van Nederland
2015, The Hague: scp.
Blom, F., J.W. Maas and T. Steffens (2014) Meer groei, minder middenklasse?, The Boston
Consulting Group, www.bcg.nl/documents/ﬁle172773.pdf (seen on 8 June 2015).
Bourdieu, P. (1984) Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Boutellier, H. (2011) De improvisatiemaatschappij. Over de sociale ordening van een
onbegrensde wereld, Amsterdam: Boom Lemma uitgevers.
Bovens, M., P. Dekker and W. Tiemeijer (ed.) (2014) Gescheiden werelden. Een verkenning
van sociaal-culturele tegenstellingen in Nederland, The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel
Planbureau & Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid.
1 0 1
Bovens, M. and A.C. Wille (2011) Diplomademocratie. Over de spanning tussen meritocratie
en democratie, Amsterdam: Prometheus.
Bucx, F. (ed.) (2011) Gezinsrapport 2011: Een portret van het gezinsleven in Nederland, The
Hague: scp.
Burkhardt, C. et al. (2012) Mittelschicht unter Druck?, Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann
Stiftung.
Buyung-Chul Han (2010) Müdigkeitsgesellschaft, Berlin: Matthes & Seitz.
Caminada, K., J. Been, K. Goudswaard and M. de Graaf-Zijl (2014) De ontwikkeling van
inkomensongelijkheid en inkomensherverdeling in Nederland 1990-2012, Research
Memoradum. Leiden: Universiteit van Leiden.
Chauvel, L. (2006) Les classes moyennes à la dérive, Paris: Le Seuil.
Chkalova, K., A. Goudswaard, J. Sanders and W. Smits (2015) Dynamiek op de Nederlandse
arbeidsmarkt. De focus op ﬂexibilisering, The Hague: cbs.
Commissie vraagﬁnanciering mbo (2017) Doorleren werkt. Samen investeren in nieuwe
zekerheid, 4 April 2017.
Dalen, R. van (2015) ‘Op zoek naar de vergeten middenklassen’, Sociologie 11, 3/4: 545-556.
Dallinger, U. (2013) ‘The endangered middle class? A comparative analysis of the role
played by income redistribution’, Journal of European Social Policy, 23, I: 83-1.
Davis, D.E. (2004) Discipline and development: Middle classes and prosperity in East Asia
and Latin America, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
De Beer, P. (2008) De middenklasse onder druk, pp. 15-42 in wrr (ed.) De kwetsbare
middenklasse: Debattenreeks Hollands Spoor, The Hague: wrr/Strategieberaad
Rijksbreed.
De Beer, P. (2015) ‘Staat de middenklasse onder druk?’, Beleid en Maatschappij 42, 2:
146-155.
De Beer, P. (2017) ‘De inkomensdynamiek van de middengroepen in de periode 1989-2013’
pp. 175-197 in G. Engbersen et al. (ed.) De val van de middenklasse? Het stabiele en
kwetsbare midden, The Hague: The Netherlands Scientiﬁc Council for
Government Policy (wrr).
De Beer, P. and E. Verhulp (2017) Dertig vragen en antwoorden over ﬂexibel werk,
Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam (aias).
De Graaf, P.M. and M. Kalmijn (2006) ‘Change and stability in the social determinants of
divorce. A comparison of marriage cohorts in the Netherlands’, European
Sociological Review, 22, 5: 561-572.
De Lange, M., J. Tolsma and M. Wolbers (ed.) (2015) Opleiding als sociale scheidslijn: Een
nieuw perspectief op een oude kloof, Antwerp/Apeldoorn: Garant.
De Swaan, A. (1990) ‘Jealousy as a class phenomenon: the petty bourgeoisie and social
security’, pp. 168-181 in A. de Swaan (1990) The management of normality,
London: Routledge.
De Swaan, A. (1989) Zorg en de staat. Welzijn, onderwijs en gezondheidszorg in Europa en de
Verenigde Staten in de nieuwe tijd, Amsterdam: Bert Bakker.
De Waard, P. (2015) ‘De val van de middenklasse’, De Volkskrant, 20 June 2015.
1 0 2 t h e  f a l l  o f  t h e  m i d d l e  c l a s s ?
Den Ridder, J., P. Dekker and P. van Houwelingen, with E. Schrijver (2016) cob
Burgerperspectieven 2016|1, The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau.
Dekker, F. (2017) ‘Flexibilisering in Nederland: trends, kansen en risico’s’, pp. 69-87 in M.
Kremer et al. (eds.) Voor de zekerheid. De toekomst van ﬂexibel werkenden en de
moderne organisatie van arbeid, The Hague: wrr.
Dekker, P., R. van Dijk, P. van Houwelingen, W. Mensink and Y. Sol (2015)
Burgerperspectieven 2015-4, The Hague: scp.
Dekker, P., J. den Ridder and P. van Houwelingen (2017) Burgerperspectieven 2017-1, The
Hague: scp.
Dekker, P., W. Tiemeijer and M. Bovens (2016) ‘Het zijn de academici: opleiding als sociale
en politiek-culturele scheidslijn’, pp. 153-168 in A.E. Bronner et. al (ed.)
Ontwikkelingen in het marktonderzoek: Jaarboek MarktOnderzoekAssociatie, vol.
41, Haarlem: Spaar en Hout.
Ehrenreich, B. (1989) Fear of falling. The inner life of the middle class, New York: Pantheon
Books.
Elchardus, M. (2015) ‘Dubieuze merite, reëel precariaat: een sociaal en cultureel rapport dat
het verschil zou kunnen maken’, Sociologie 11, 3/4: 576-582.
Engelen, E, A. Hemerijck and W. Trommel (eds.) (2007) Van sociale bescherming naar
sociale investering, The Hague: Lemma.
Erikson, R. and J.H. Goldthorpe (1992) The constant ﬂux: A study of class mobility in
industrial societies, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Erikson, R., J.H. Goldthorpe and L. Portocarero (1979) ‘Intergenerational class mobility in
three western European societies’, British Journal of Sociology 30, 4: 415-441.
Eydems, E. (1998) Werken voor weinig. Loyaliteit en uitkeringsnijd onder laag betaalden,
Amsterdam: UvA (dissertation).
Fourquet, J., A. Mergier and C. Peugny (2013) Le grand malaise. Enquête sur les classes
moyennes, Paris: Jean Jaures Fondation.
Frank, R.H. (2007) Falling behind. How Rising Inequality Harms the Middle Class, Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Ganzeboom, H. (2015) ‘Wel verschillen, geen verbanden: een gemiste kans?’, Sociologie 11,
3/4: 583-586.
Ganzeboom, H. (2017) ‘Polariseert de beroepshiërarcie en verdwijnt de middenklasse?’ pp.
115-141 in G. Engbersen et al. (ed.) De val van de middenklasse? Het stabiele en
kwetsbare midden, The Hague: The Netherlands Scientiﬁc Council for
Government Policy (wrr).
Giddens, A. (2000) The Third Way and Its Critics, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Goldthorpe, J. H., C. Llewellynen C. Payne (1980) Social mobility and class structure in
modern Britain, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Goldthorpe, J.H., D. Lockwood, F. Bechhofer and J. Platt (1969) The Afﬂuent Worker,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Goos, M. and A. Manning (2007) ‘Lousy and lovely jobs: The rising polarization of work in
Britain’, Review of Economics and Statistics 89, 1: 118-133.
r e f e r e n c e s 1 0 3
Goos, M., A. Manning and A. Salomons (2009) ‘Job polarization in Europe’, The American
Economic Review 99, 2: 58-63.
Goos M., A. Manning and A. Salomons (2014) ‘Explaining job polarization: Routine-biased
technological change and offshoring’, American Economic Review 104, 8:
2509-2526.
Hacker, J.S (2008) The Great Risk Shift: The New Economic Insecurity and the Decline of the
American Dream, New York: Oxford University Press.
Hall, P. and M. Lamont (2013) (eds.) Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Era, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Heijne, B. (2008) De Hollandse Paradox, pp. 43-52 in wrr (ed.) De kwetsbare middenklasse:
Debattenreeks Hollands Spoor, The Hague: wrr/Strategieberaad Rijksbreed.
Hufﬁngton, A. (2010) Third World America: How Our Politicians Are Abandoning the
Middle Class and Betraying the American Dream, New York: Random House.
Kremer, M. (2017) ‘De verschillende gezichten van onzekerheid. Flexibel werkenden over
werk, familie en sociale zekerheid’, pp. 97-122 in M. Kremer et al. (eds.) Voor de
zekerheid. De toekomst van ﬂexibel werkenden en de moderne organisatie van
arbeid, The Hague: wrr.
Kremer, M., M. Bovens, E. Schrijvers and R. Went (eds.) (2014) Hoe ongelijk is Nederland?
Een verkenning van de ontwikkeling en gevolgen van economische ongelijkheid,
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Kremer, M., R. Went and A. Knottnerus (eds.) (2017) Voor de zekerheid. De toekomst van
ﬂexibel werkenden en de moderne organisatie van arbeid, The Hague: wrr.
Lauer, R.H. (1981) Temporal Man: The Meaning and Uses of Social Time, New York: Praeger.
Leisering, L. and S. Leibfried (1999) Time and poverty in Western welfare states. United
Germany in perspective, Cambridge (uk): Cambridge University Press.
Lengveld, H. and J. Hirsche (2009) ‘Die Angst der Mittelschicht vor dem sozialen Abstieg.
Ein Längschnittsanalyse 1984-2007’, Zeitschrift für Soziologie 38, 5: 379-398.
Madland, D. (2015) Hollowed out, why the economy doesn’t work without a strong middle
class, Oakland (Cal.): University of California Press.
Mau, S. (2012) Lebenschancen. Wohin driftet die Mittelschicht?, Berlin: Suhrkamp.
Mau, S. (2013) ‘European Middle Classes in Trouble?’, Perspectives on Europe 43, 1: 27-31.
Mau, S. (2014) ‘Mittelschicht: das unbekannte Wesen?’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 64,
49: 3-10.
Mau, S., J. Mewes and J. Schöneck (2012) ‘What Determines Subjective Socio-Economic
Insecurity? Context and Class in Comparative Perspective’, Socio-Economic
Review 10, 4: 655–682.
Maurin, E. (2009) La peur du déclassement. Une sociologie des récessions, Paris: Le Seuil.
Ministry of General Affairs (2015) Troonrede 2015, available at: www.rijksoverheid.nl/
documenten/toespraken/2015/09/15/troonrede-2015.
Murray, C. (2012) Coming apart, the state of white America 1960-2010, New York: Random
House.
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (cpb) (2016) Onzekere wereld /
Overheidstekort neemt af. Macroeconomische verkenning 2017, The Hague: cpb.
1 0 4 t h e  f a l l  o f  t h e  m i d d l e  c l a s s ?
Newman, C. (1988) Falling from Grace. The Experience of Downward Mobility in the
American Middle Class, New York: Vintage Books.
oecd (2015) In it together: why less inequality beneﬁts all. Overview of inequality trends, key
ﬁndings and policy directions, Paris: oecd.
Olsthoorn, M., E. Pommer, M. Ras, A. van der Torre and J.M. Wildeboer Schut (2017)
Voorzieningen verdeeld. Proﬁjt van de overheid, The Hague: scp.
Parker, S. (ed.) (2013) The squeezed middle: the pressure on ordinary workers in America and
Britain, Bristol: The Policy Press.
Parliamentary Papers II 2014/15. 32140, 5, 16 September 2014.
Peugny, C. (2009) Le déclassement, Paris: Grasset.
Peugny, C. (2013) Le destin au berceau. Inégalités et reproduction sociale, Paris: Le Seuil.
Pew Research Center, (2015) Most Say Government Policies Since Recession Have Done Little
to Help Middle Class, Poor, Pew Research Center, 4 March 2015, available at:
www.people- press.org/ﬁles/2015/03/03-04-15-Economy-release.pdf.
Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Pleijers, A. and M. Hartgers (2016) ‘Een leven lang leren in Nederland. Een overzicht’ in
cbs: Sociaaleconomische trends, February 2016/02.
Pommer, E. (ed.) (2011) Minder voor het midden. Proﬁjt van de overheid in 2007, The Hague:
scp.
Putnam, R. (2015) Our kids. The American dream in crisis, New York: Simon & Schuster.
Roeters, A. and F. Bucx (2016) Het gebruik van kinderopvang door ouders met lagere
inkomens. Beleidssignalement, The Hague: scp.
Roeters, A., J.D. Vlasblom and E. Josten (2016) ‘Groeiende onzekerheid? De toekomst van
ons werk’, pp. 76-107 in A. van den Broek et al. (eds.) De toekomst tegemoet. Leren,
werken, zorgen, samenleven en consumeren in het Nederland van later. Sociaal en
cultureel rapport 2016, The Hague: scp.
Salverda, W. (2014) ‘De tektoniek van inkomensongelijkheid in Nederland’, pp.39-58 in M.
Kremer et al. (ed.) Hoe ongelijk is Nederland? Een verkenning van de ontwikkeling en
gevolgen van economische ongelijkheid. The Hague: Wetenschappelijke Raad voor
het Regeringsbeleid.
Salverda, W. (2016) ‘Stagnating incomes and the middle class in the Netherlands: running
to stand still?’, pp. 396-440 in D. Vaughan-Whitehead (ed.) (2016) Europe’s
Disappearing Middle Class? Evidence from the World of Work, Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar.
Salverda, W. (2017) ‘Hollen om stil te staan? Tweeverdieners en de Nederlandse
middenklasse sinds 1990’ pp. 143-174 in G. Engbersen et al. (ed.) De val van de
middenklasse? Het stabiele en kwetsbare midden, The Hague: The Netherlands
Scientiﬁc Council for Government Policy (wrr).
Salverda, W. and E. de Jong (2017) The Dutch middle class in times of income inequality
1990-2014: The crucial rise of dual earners, aias Working Paper 171, March 2017.
Savage, M. (2015) Social class in the 21th century, Milton Keynes: Penguin books.
r e f e r e n c e s 1 0 5
Savage, M., F. Devine, N. Cunningham, M. Taylor, Y. Li, J. Hjellbrekke and A. Miles (2013) ‘A
new model of social class? Findings from the bbc’s Great British Class Survey
Experiment’, Sociology 47, 2: 219-250.
Schimank, U., S. Mau and O. Groh-Samberg (2014) Statusarbeit unter Druck? Zur
Lebensführung der Mittelschichten, Basle: Beltz Verlag.
Schmeets, H. (2017) Vertrouwen in elkaar en in de samenleving, The Hague: wrr Working
Paper no. 26.
Schuyt, C.J.M. and E. Taverne (2000) 1950. Welvaart in zwart-wit, The Hague: Sdu
Uitgevers.
Scockpol, T. (2000) The missing middle: working families and the future of American social
policy, New York: W.W. Norton.
Senneth, R. (1998) The Corrosion of Character, The Personal Consequences of Work In the
New Capitalism, New York/London: W.W. Norton & Company.
Social and Economic Council (ser) (2016a) Mens en technologie. Samen aan het werk, ser
Verkenning October 2016, The Hague: ser.
Social and Economic Council (ser) (2016b) Gelijk goed van start: visie op het toekomstige
stelsel van voorzieningen voor jonge kinderen, The Hague: ser.
Social and Economic Council (ser) (2017) Leren en ontwikkelen tijdens de loopbaan – een
richtinggevend advies, The Hague: ser.
Soede, A., S. Hoff and J. Kullberg (2014) ‘Kapitale tegenstellingen? De maatschappelijke
betekenis van ﬁnanciële ongelijkheid’, pp. 105-138 in C. Vrooman, M. Gijsberts and
J. Boelhouwer (ed.) Verschil in Nederland. Sociaal en cultureel rapport 2014, The
Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau.
Standing, G. (2012) The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class, London & New York:
Bloomsbury Academic.
Statistics Netherlands (cbs) (2009) Relatie en gezin aan het begin van de 21ste eeuw, The
Hague/Heerlen: cbs.
Statistics Netherlands (cbs) (2014) Welvaart in Nederland. Inkomen, bestedingen en
vermogens van huishoudens en personen, The Hague/Heerlen: cbs.
Statistics Netherlands (cbs) (2016a) ‘Vinex-stellen minder vaak uit elkaar dan gemiddeld’,
www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2016/31/vinex-stellen-minder-vaak-uitelkaar-dan-
gemiddeld (seen on 19 April 2017).
Statistics Netherlands (cbs) (2016b) ‘Methodologische toelichting Relatieontbinding in
Vinex-wijken’, www.cbs.nl/-/media/_pdf/2016/31/relatieontbinding-in-vinex-
wijken.pdf (seen on 19 April 2017).
Stegeman, H. (2016) ‘De stagnerende middenklasse’, Reformatorisch Dagblad, 6 August
2016.
Ter Weel, B. (2012) Loonongelijkheid in Nederland stijgt. Banen in het midden onder druk,
The Hague: cpb Policy Brief 2012/06.
Ter Weel, B. (2015) ‘De match tussen mens en machine’, Beleid en Maatschappij 42, 2:
156-170.
The Economist (2017) ‘Lifelong Learning. How to survive in the age of automation’, The
Economist 422, 9023, 14-20 January 2017.
1 0 6 t h e  f a l l  o f  t h e  m i d d l e  c l a s s ?
The Labour Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid) (2013) ‘Perspectief voor een sociaal én
ondernemend land: uit de crisis, met goed werk, op weg naar 2020’, available at:
www.stvda.nl/~/media/Files/Stvda/Convenanten_Verklaringen/
2010_2019/2013/2 0130411-sociaal-akkoord.ash.
The Netherlands Scientiﬁc Council for Government Policy (wrr) (2008) (ed.) De
kwetsbare middenklasse: Debattenreeks Hollands Spoor, The Hague: wrr/
Strategieberaad Rijksbreed.
The Netherlands Scientiﬁc Council for Government Policy (wrr) (2013) Naar een lerende
economie, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Thomassen, J. (2010) De permanente crisis van de democratie. Valedictory oration, 24
September 2010, Enschede: University of Twente.
Thurow, L. (1984) ‘The Disappearance of the Middle Class’, New York Times, F.3, February
1984.
Tolsma, J. and M.H.J. Wolbers (2010) Naar een open samenleving. Recente ontwikkelingen in
sociale stijging en daling in Nederland, The Hague: rmo.
Tolsma, J. and M.H.J. Wolbers (2017) ‘Ontwikkelingen in de maatschappelijke positie van
middelbaar opgeleiden in Nederland’ pp. 93-113 in G. Engbersen et al. (ed.) De val
van de middenklasse? Het stabiele en kwetsbare midden, The Hague: The
Netherlands Scientiﬁc Council for Government Policy (wrr).
Van Bavel, B. (2014) ‘Vermogensongelijkheid in Nederland, de vergeten dimensie’, pp.
79-100 in M. Kremer et.al (ed.) Hoe ongelijk is Nederland? Een verkenning van de
ontwikkeling en gevolgen van economische ongelijkheid, The Hague: The
Netherlands Scientiﬁc Council for Government Policy (wrr).
Van Eijk, G. (2011) ‘Klassenverschillen in Nederland: percepties, ontkenning en moraliteit’,
Sociologie 7, 3: 248-269.
Van Kersbergen, K. and B. Vis (2016) De verzorgingsstaat, Amsterdam: Amsterdam
University Press.
Van Lieshout, P. (2016) ‘De toekomst van de sociale (on)zekerheid’, pp. 7-27 in P. van
Lieshout (ed.) Sociale (on)zekerheid. De voorziene toekomst, Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press.
Van den Berge, W. and B. ter Weel (2015) Baanpolarisatie in Nederland. Middensegment
onder druk, The Hague: cpb Policy Brief 2015/13.
Van der Brug, W. and T. van der Meer (2015) ‘De volatiliteit van de middengroepen’, Beleid
en Maatschappij 42, 2: 171-180.
Van der Klein, M. (2017) ‘Zoeken naar zekerheid, inkomen en eigen regie: de wensen van
werkenden’, pp. 123-127 in M. Kremer et al. (eds.) Voor de zekerheid. De toekomst
van ﬂexibel werkenden en de moderne organisatie van arbeid, The Hague: wrr.
Van der Meer, T. (2017) Niet de kiezer is gek, Houten: Unieboek/Het Spectrum.
Van der Meer, T., E. van Elsas, R. Lubbe and W. van der Brug (2012) ‘Kieskeurige kiezers.
Een panelstudie naar de veranderlijkheid van partijvoorkeuren’, Beleid en
Maatschappij 39, 2: 153-178.
r e f e r e n c e s 1 0 7
Van der Veen, R. (2016) ‘Sociale zekerheid in een open samenleving. Postindustrialisering
en de toekomst van de sociale zekerheid’ pp. 89-112 in P. van Lieshout (ed.) Sociale
(on)zekerheid. De voorziene toekomst, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Van der Waal, J., W. de Koster and J. van Noord (2017) ‘Opleidingsverschillen in
maatschappelijk onbehagen en wantrouwen in de politiek in Nederland,
1970-2012’ pp. 199-231 in G. Engbersen et al. (ed.) De val van de middenklasse? Het
stabiele en kwetsbare midden, The Hague: The Netherlands Scientiﬁc Council for
Government Policy (wrr).
Vaughan-Whitehead, D. (ed.) (2016) Europe’s Disappearing Middle Class? Evidence from the
World of Work, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
Vrooman, C. (2016) Meedoen in onzekerheid: verwachtingen over participatie en protectie
(Oration), available at: www.uu.nl/sites/default/ﬁles/fsw-vroomanoratie.pdf.
Vrooman, C., M. Gijsberts and J. Boelhouwer (eds.) (2014) Verschil in Nederland. Sociaal en
cultureel rapport 2014, The Hague: scp.
Vrooman, C. and J.M. Wildeboer Schut (2015) ‘Op rozen zitten of op zwart zaad. Twee
decennia inkomensongelijkheid’, Mens & Maatschappij 90, 4: 343-378.
Weber, M. (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (2 vols.),
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Went, R., M. Kremer and A. Knottnerus (eds.) (2015) De robot de baas: De toekomst van
werk in het tweede machinetijdperk, The Hague: wrr.
Wijmans, L. (1987) Beeld en betekenis van het maatschappelijk midden, Amsterdam: Van
Gennep.
Wildeboer Schut, J.M. and S. Hoff (2016) Een lang tekort. Langdurige armoede in Nederland,
The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau.
Wilkinson, R. and K. Pickett (2009) The Spirit Level. Why Equality is Better for Everyone,
London: Penguin Books.
Wöltgens, T. (2008) ‘Links moet zich weer met veel nadruk richten op het vraagstuk van de
verdeling’, nrc Handelsblad (Opinie & Debat), 12 and 13 April 2008.
Zijderveld (1991) Staccato cultuur, ﬂexibele maatschappij en verzorgende staat, Utrecht:
Lemma.
1 0 8 t h e  f a l l  o f  t h e  m i d d l e  c l a s s ?
THE FALL OF THE MIDDLE CLASS?
Rugdikte: 6.7mm – 16/01/2018 – Textcetera
STABILITY AND VULNERABILITY IN THE MIDDLE SEGMENT OF SOCIETY
Contrary to what many disturbing reports might suggest, 
the middle class is not in decline and is not being eroded in the 
Netherlands. The majority of the members of the middle groups 
in society are maintaining their position, but are having to work 
harder and accept greater uncertainty in doing so.
Households increasingly need two incomes and have to adapt 
to the flexible and temporary nature of work. They are also 
required to combine work with care tasks and need to display a 
greater ability to fend for themselves in coping with risks.
This combination of tasks is accompanied by a growing sense 
of insecurity, as well as a feeling that the government is doing 
too little for the middle groups in society. It is important for the 
government to focus on reducing insecurity in order to assuage 
the vulnerability and bolster the stability of the middle groups 
in society.
The WRR publication The Fall of the Middle Class? Stability 
and Vulnerability in the Middle Segment of Society provides 
an insight into the changes that have occurred in the middle 
segment of Dutch society since the 1970s. The analysis 
encompasses four aspects: developments affecting people with 
middle incomes, with intermediate skills and in intermediate 
occupations, as well as attitudes towards politics and society.
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